

ONE

Sonance

How may we undertake to represent representation? What task unfolds from that endeavor? Do we presuppose an end, a measure, to which any representation may be subjected, or does the representation of representation exceed any scale? Can we speak in a neutral voice that does not represent its own representativity, or does representation's voice drown out any neutrality? Shall we employ a familiar voice that resonates harmoniously in our ear, or a voice that echoes the discordances between any representation and its representativity? And familiar to whom? Who are the "we" so represented? Will "you" listen to an unfamiliar voice that seeks to sound the excesses of its representativity? Will "you" find yourself subjected once more to an alien representation?

Within nature's strife, Heraclitus tells, the harmony of the *logos* resounds.

It is necessary to understand that war is universal and justice is strife, and that all things take place in accordance with strife and necessity.

They do not comprehend how, though it is at variance with itself, it agrees with itself. It is a harmony of opposed tensions, as in the bow and the lyre.¹

We may hear the *logos* as an affinity that overcomes discord or as univocal in its discordances. We may wonder how the single sound of the lyre, its univocity, can keep us from the domination of identity,² how the sonance of the One, in nature or in representation, may echo transgression. We hope to listen to nature's sonance, the ring of representation. Does it matter that representation echoes as it shines? Can nature's music echo what remains invisible within its colored rainbows?

What would happen if we were to represent representation's representativity in a sonorescent voice, listening to the ring of representation, echoing the sonance of nature along with its radiance? Would representativity become more aware of itself in its reverberations? Would we make ourselves more familiar with its unfamiliarity?

Shall we with Irigaray envision the luminance of nature's representation within the critique of metaphysics as totalizing and specular?

Rising to a perspective that would dominate the totality, to the vantage point of greatest power, he thus cuts himself off from the bedrock, from his empirical relationship with the matrix that he claims to survey. To specularize and to speculate.

“Nature” is forever dodging his projects of representation, of reproduction.³

Even where we would abandon the hard edges of representation’s exclusions, we return with Gadamer repeatedly to its visibility.

The beautiful appears not only in what is visibly present to the senses, but in such a way that the latter is really there only through it, ie emerges as one out of the whole. The beautiful is truly “most radiant” (*to ekphanestaton*) out of itself. . . .

“Radiance,” then, is not only one of the qualities of what is beautiful, but constitutes its actual being.⁴

The radiance of being’s appearance repeats the illumination of thought against its representation. Yet perhaps light’s luminosity darkens our eye, calls for the attention of the ear. Perhaps the eye’s specularizations repeat the authority of the subject without authorization.

In relation to the ear, Derrida speaks of philosophy as “thinking its other,” thinking it for itself, to make it its own: “*To insist upon thinking its other; . . . In thinking it as such, in recognizing it, one misses it. One reappropriates it for oneself.*”⁵ Philosophy hopes to reappropriate its limits without peril, reestablishing its authority. Yet questions of thinking and of the other, of representation, echo danger and risk.

Or indeed does the limit, obliquely, by surprise, always reserve one more blow for philosophical knowledge?⁶

In other words, can one puncture the tympanum of a philosopher and still be heard and understood by him?⁷

Following this theme, the critique of metaphysics as representation may repeat a thought of something other to metaphysics and representation, a thought neither metaphysical nor representational, without surprise, without risk. How may we philosophize at risk? Through the univocity of being, its inexhaustibility? Listening to its sonance, its music, against the radiance of its visibility?

Perhaps every risk repeats a movement that would refuse any risk, including the movement from radiance to sonance, from light to sound, still within familiar authority: “In relaying the inner hammer, one risks permitting the noisiest discourse to participate in the most serene, least disturbed, best served economy of philosophical irony. Which is to say, and examples of this metaphysical drumming are not lacking today, that in taking this risk, one risks nothing.”⁸ Familiarity risks nothing in the serenity of its equanimity. Yet even the noisiest representations may participate in the serenity of representational irony, an irony that risks nothing in the drumming of its iconoclasms. Perhaps

we find ourselves facing an impossible task in placing philosophy's representations and self-representations at risk, where every risk risks nothing. How can we *risk* something? How can we risk *something*? How can representation represent *itself* at risk? How can it be surprised within its self-representations?

Perhaps Derrida himself risks nothing, even knowingly. Perhaps the obliqueness of the tympanum in the inner ear, that would place nature's sonance at risk, repeats the authority of his writing, his representations. "The tympanum squints [*louche*]." ⁹ It squints with cunning, deception, danger. But not to Irigaray, not enough, not at risk, still under the rule of the eye: danger without risk. "The 'subject' sidles up to the truth, squints at it, obliquely, in an attempt to gain possession of what truth can no longer say."¹⁰ The movement of effacement remains controlling.

She authorizes us to throw everything authoritative away. "Turn everything upside down, inside out, back to front. *Rack it with radical convulsions*, . . . *Overthrow syntax* by suspending its eternally teleological order, . . . Make it impossible for a while to predict whence, whither, when, how, why . . . something goes by or goes on: will come, will spread, will reverse, will cease moving."¹¹ For a while we place ourselves in danger, upset our serenity—only to seek another. Or do we always? How might we always be at risk, and how would we represent it where representation became familiar? Who could tolerate it? How can we philosophize without such risk? How can we philosophize with it? The burden, always the burden, falls on us to struggle with our yearning for comfort, for familiarity, by placing ourselves, our thoughts and representations, always at risk in representation. And what of those threatened by danger, for whom suffering and death are dangers? What of the risk that risks too much? What of the risk that risks nothing?

The risk of risking nothing remains between Derrida and Irigaray, remains within them. Neither suggests reversing the movement of danger, not even momentarily, to wonder whether, if the risk of representation always fails to place itself at risk, then perhaps the movement of authority and rule always places itself at risk. The authority of representation, philosophical and political, always resounds at risk even when silent as to its dangers.

Perhaps, Foucault suggests, representation always echoes at risk even in its most authoritative forms. Perhaps the risk before us requires risking risk itself as we attempt to represent representation: "I am supposing that in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality."¹² The production of discourse, representation, is always perilous and always hides from danger. The greatest danger is of our identity, to Trinh Minh-ha, our Western identity.

What is at stake is not only the hegemony of Western cultures, but also their identities as unified cultures. . . . The West is painfully made to realize the existence of a Third World in the First World, and vice versa. The Master is bound to recognize that His Culture is not as homogeneous, as monolithic as He believed it to be. He discovers, with much reluctance, He is just an other among others.¹³

The Master discovers that He has always been an other among others, heterogeneously, has always imperiled Himself even within His greatest Authority. This discovery doubles, exceeds itself: we are always in danger, in life, in discourse, in representation, and the greatest difficulty is placing ourselves, our authority, at risk. Representation risks everything and nothing, risks subjugation and oppression within a blindness dangerously opaque to every danger. Representation risks even the critique in which it has refused to be at risk, for even though we did not represent it so, it was always in danger. But we have always so represented it. Representation, nature's sonance, places itself inescapably at risk, displaces itself, where one recurrent danger is obliviousness toward any danger.

We find ourselves questioning the ways in which representation has echoed within the recordings of Western thought, has repeatedly sounded discordant tones of images and writing, as if danger resounds incessantly within every familiar representation even as it has been denied. Philosophy has repeatedly sounded its suspicions of representation, from Plato's critique of writing and pictorial representation to Heidegger's critique of metaphysics as the representation of being. "Metaphysics thinks beings as being in the manner of representational thinking which gives reasons."¹⁴ Yet philosophy has repeatedly claimed the truth of its own representations of the limits of representation, claimed authority over itself. In the percussions of this antiphony echo endless questions of representation, of itself and of we, where we find ourselves at risk in representation, and where representation risks itself in us.

Such discordance appears in Plato, who follows his famous critique of writing in *Phaedrus* with the idea of a discourse "written in the soul of the learner, . . . that can defend itself, and knows to whom it should speak and to whom say nothing (*Phaedrus*, 276a),"¹⁵ and his critique of mimetic poetry in *Republic* by questioning whether poetry may "not justly return from this exile after she has pleaded her defense, whether in lyric or other measure" (*Republic*, 607d). Plato's writing is mimetic, and his critique of representation cannot escape the discordances of representation. Why should we imagine that it could? In Kant, the sublime exceeds representation while echoing within it:

*the sublime is that, the mere ability to think which shows a faculty of the mind surpassing every standard of sense.*¹⁶

an object . . . *the representation of which determines the mind to think the unattainability of nature regarded as a presentation of ideas.*¹⁷

A representation utterly beyond representation makes no sound while the echo of its representation belongs to representation. Here representation returns to place itself at risk as the representation of representation: multiple representation.

In Plato and Kant, the critique and excesses of representation ring in representation. Within the critique of representation there sounds a countermovement that surpasses the limits of representation and its critique, still within representation. The form of that movement echoes the return of representation to itself, the representation of representation as history and time, as danger. The history of history questions itself as both history and representation. The history of representation risks itself as transgression. "The limit and transgression depend on each other for whatever density of being they possess: a limit could not exist if it were absolutely uncrossable and, reciprocally, transgression would be pointless if it merely crossed a limit composed of illusions and shadows."¹⁸ But it rings in representation and marks its excesses by the music of its play.

In Plato and Kant, the self-canceling play of self-representation takes the form of art. In writings after Nietzsche and Heidegger, metaphysics and science, if not history and art, appear deaf to their own representativity, refusing their own discordance in the name of privilege. If we think of refusing even this refusal, still distrustful of privilege, especially of its restoration in the highest and most extreme, the privilege of a Great Refusal, we may return to question representation's diaphonies. We may then sound the possibility of retrieving metaphysics, even science, within its critique through a representation of nature that does not deafen itself to its own representativity, a voice suspicious of every priority, including its own. This refusal of the refusal of metaphysics echoes the percussions of our refrain, reverberating with repercussions of reality and representation. In the ring of representation, unending questions peal forth.

Privilege refuses to countenance its own dividedness, refuses to place its representativity at risk. How might we refuse both privilege and our own refusal? How might we place our own refusal at risk? We refuse privilege by dismembering its authority. To imagine refusing even this refusal, we question the discordance of every representation, including our own, and the mutilation of whatever falls authoritatively into representation. The refusal of representational authority unfolds as question after question of deferral,¹⁹ divided within itself as deference and delay. Deferral echoes acquiescence and postponement, refuses the identity of representation with measure and completion. Yet to question even its own privilege, of an undivided representation of the dividedness of representation, deferral solicits its own deferral, echoes its inexhaustibility. "As long as words of difference serve to legitimate a discourse instead of delaying its authority to infinity, they are, to borrow an image from Audre Lorde, 'noteworthy only as decorations.'"²⁰ The refusal of epistemic priority echoes a critique of Western representation while the critique of this critique defers its own deferral to question representation's representation, still a critique of Western privilege. In these cir-

cular multiplicities of representation and deferral, *technē*, *praxis* and *poiēsis*, materializes as nature's *ergon*, work, whereas truth echoes its untruth. The representation of nature, always *technē*, circles back to echo as nature's *ergon*; the resonances of truth reverberate with excesses of discord and diaphony. In the percussions of these circularities resound the repercussions of representation.

Representation lives in many worlds and in close proximity to countless others. They, in return, reside in representation's vicinity even where they reverberate outside it—a proximity too close to measure. Nature and reality, power, desire, and history, resound in representation. Representation, here, dwells near the limits of nature and history, as they dwell near it, calling forth incessant questions of authority and power. For representation echoes *technē*, inhabits spheres of form and measure. Multiple representation falls between freedom and rule, nature and artifice, sonority and measure, and between the pairs. It returns to question *technē* again and again, as excess and deferral, resounds as *poiēsis*.

This proximity, between nature and representation, composes a region in which we may hope to retrieve philosophy from its close as we retrieve representation from its prohibition. We seek to question Western modernity's critique of itself, but not by repudiating that critique as if it had no truth. We seek instead to avoid a concordant portrayal of the truth of critique, especially a critique of truth. We consider the possibility of a local sonorescence situated among the dissonances between poetry and philosophy, where representation interrogates its truth and where authority repudiates itself.²¹ The juncture at which philosophy exceeds and falls into representation echoes politics and truth—the reappearance of the philosopher-king as a figure of transgression. Within that juncture, philosophy represents itself as local, finite, as it rings in representation and as it represents its own representativity. We question the locality of representation through the intonation of its representations: where poetry presents its challenge to philosophy, where philosophy seeks to represent its own representativity, and where we repeatedly echo to ourselves the challenge of our we.

How may we think after modernity, after Nietzsche and Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Dewey, taking hold of their Westernness and maleness? How may we utter what follows our Western tradition after its close and in its refrain? These questions resound of nature and truth. The "of" appears as representation, where we appear as representing and represented, tolling unending questions of this doubling of representation. Questioning it asks us to rethink our time and history, to represent a juncture in our history as a junction within representation and truth. Questioning the limits of representation asks us to sound the limits of our history at the edges of our bodies and our worlds.

When Heidegger speaks of metaphysics, he speaks of representation: "What characterizes metaphysical thinking which grounds the ground for beings is the fact that metaphysical thinking, starting from what is present, represents it in its presence and thus exhibits it as grounded by its ground."²² He speaks of

metaphysics and also representation. Does this mark of representation echo representation? Do we, when we speak of speaking, in our critique of metaphysical representation, always say the same again? May the also of representation in relation to metaphysics be heard again as metaphysics, or does the voice of the end of metaphysics resound as no longer metaphysical, perhaps metamusical? May the representation of representation no longer sound as representational? May it echo excess?

The representation of which Heidegger speaks echoes cacophonically, as that which repeats the obscurity of metaphysics and as an opening within that obscurity. Multiple representation opens a space within representation. This opening within representation reveals the diaphonic circularity of its representations in nature's sonance. "It may be about this multiplicity that philosophy, being situated, inscribed, and included within it, has never been able to reason."²³ Philosophy has never been able to represent its multiplicities. Is this another escape from risk in the "onlyness" of philosophy's relation to its limits?

Philosophy finds itself surrounded by endless "onlys": "only representation," "philosophy only," "only Western," "rational only." The "onlys" represent limits within representation and history whose endless repetitions gesture beyond the limits of representation. The limits of representation sound the limits of what echoes as "only" representation, while representation surpasses every "only." The limits of history echo repetitions of what resounds as "only" history where history includes every every. Each limit presents itself as a univocal, nature's sonance, the single voice of being, history, and representation, even of identity, each disrupting itself, questioning any identity, including its own.

If the univocity of nature permits difference to escape the limits of identity, perhaps the multiplicities of representations may permit nature to escape the limits of its univocity.²⁴ The escape from identity and representation peals a percussion that requires repercussion, again and again, to escape from itself, again. This escape in time, in repetition, unfolds as *praxis*: another self-canceling identity of history and representation. Each such pervasive form appears as another univocal; history and representation; *technē*, *praxis*, and *poiēsis*; power, desire, and nature; truth and embodiment—with the others, and still others. Each echoes itself. Each echoes the others in circles of circles and questions of questions, dislocating the domination of identity and the dominion of its universality. Nature rings out as fragmentary, discordant, multiple; harmony and diaphony, consonance and dissonance. Our nature, multiple and fragmentary, appears to escape the dominion of its identity "only" in the embrace of its materiality, weighed down by oppressions of race and class, sexuality and gender, by rule of law.

We may wonder if, where thought questions its limits, representation may question its relations to itself, its self-understanding, and its relations to others, its self-forgetfulness. We may wonder if, where self-forgetfulness and self-understanding include themselves, where understanding may be forgotten and forget-

ting deepens into a form of understanding, modernity might become excessive—*our's* or *some other's* modernity—and reflexivity might exceed itself. This excessive excess, exceeding itself, echoes the self-forgetfulness that questions self-understanding. It redisplayes representation and nature as questions, the one repeatedly of the of, the other of itself.

In the predominant Western tradition, challenged throughout, to question reason's nature is to question science's truth. Is science the name of that form of representation in which truth and reason know themselves most fully; or are scientific reason and truth unable to represent their own limits truthfully? "By contrast, science is not an original happening of truth, but always the cultivation of a domain of truth already opened."²⁵ Our Western modernity materializes as a site where science faces the challenges of its own, if silent, multiple reflexivities, where its multiple representativity places it in incessant danger. Even where reason appears dialectical and reflective, knowing itself and its limits, it does not—some say cannot—know the limits of its knowledge of its limits. This insight defines the "problem of reflection."²⁶ In Western modernity, philosophy dwells among the others that define the scientificity of science and among the same that define the rationality of reason. It resides among the sites where modern science becomes science, by defining its limits. Yet it also dwells among the sites where science receives its greatest challenge, by questioning the limits that define its authority. The modern proximity of science and philosophy defines a region in which philosophy dissolves. Other such limiting regions are the proximity of truth and desire and of power and representation. We ask if they are regions from which may emerge questions of the truth of science and philosophy and their relatedness, questions of their and.

If science defines our modernity, then if we are to understand modernity, science calls for questioning from whatever vantage point can be taken toward it, including those we do not, and some of which we will never, know how to take. The plausibility of this conclusion is offset by the realization that the plurality of vantage points whereby science may be interrogated defines a plurality of sites for the definition of science and philosophy: art, religion, and practice no less than the reciprocity of philosophy and science, as well as *our* or *any other* modernity, Western or non-Western. The multiple limits whose representation defines philosophy, along with their limits, tear open the fabric of reason and its truthfulness, disharmonize nature's cacophonies. We find excess in excess, surplus in surplus. Excess and surplus have no (or every) name. The limits of the limits that define reason, reality, and history resound in reason, reality, and history plurally, recurrently, and discordantly. The limits of representation have no determinate representation, however oblique, without disowning the representation of their limits.

Foucault defines power in terms of four principles.²⁷ The last concerns us here: "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently,

this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power." Such a sweeping conception may be considered metaphysical. "Power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere"²⁸: immanent, productive, nonbinary, and nonsubjective. How can the "everywhere" not be metaphysical? Foucault's response is that power is pervasive without being total, since it does not include everything. This transgressive notion of an everywhere without totality unfolds questions of the possibility of a local metaphysics without metaphysicality. Could a philosophy be pervasive but not total if it cannot represent everything and cannot be represented by anything more sovereign? Nature here would be power and resistance. Reality would be everything, including its own unreality. Being would include its own nonbeing, dislocating itself. Can these univocal countermovements dismantle metaphysical authority within the ring of its musicality?

In Foucault, power includes its own alterities. Its limits lie within and without, and may be thought from within the pervasiveness of power. Or rather, resistance is neither power nor its differences, but transgression. Resistance is more of the same, to be thought within, and disruptive, shattering any established hegemony. Within every representational formation that defines power and truth, there unfolds resistance, understood as power and truth but also their difference. "There is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case."²⁹

Power presses upon us within the relations of reason to itself whose truth includes its own defilement. Reason materializes inseparable from unreason, truth from untruth, power from resistance, and production from violence. We ask how each might stand forth as the others while their nature lies between. Questioning the truth of power suggests that truth is made by power, faced and defaced by it. Questioning ideology disrupts the sanctity of a *logos* through which truth might be transparent to itself to name a between in which truth finds itself before its opposite, defined and defiled by it. The self-understandings of truth and reason cancel themselves as the will to truth.³⁰ Power materializes as the institutional, nonsubjective, self-deceptive will that constitutes and imperils subject and truth. It belongs together, inseparably, with desire. The self-deceptions of power that limit its truth themselves resound as limited by desire. In this interrogative space inhabited by the limits of illusion echoes the will to truth achieving its goal.

Our time lies between any modernity and its futures, haunted by whether our modernity will be the same again and how it might be different. In this conflict echo questions of the localities of history. History emerges as a pervasive site at which we may question the multiple movements of practice, deferral's deferral. In the localities of history unfold the limits of our humanity. In the localities of the of echo representations of our relationship to nature and the limits of every representation of our nature. Otherness to oneself—locality's locality—marks our nature's *technē*.

This rediscovery transpires as metaphysical. We are wondering whether metaphysics can be a univocal site where locality's locality may resound. We may reject metaphysics as constituting our male Western tradition's blindness to the multiple dissonances of locality. We may instead affirm the sonorescence of a transgressive metaphysics with its multiple reflexivities, still challenging the maleness and Westernness of our tradition. Metaphysics here might be a site where limitation's limitation may be heard, including a multiply reflexive challenge to the our of any culture, including our own. The status of such a possibility today is an expression of how some modernity may attempt to question its limits: in the repudiation of metaphysics, a recurrent figure in the rise of modern science, or in its sonorescence, understood as a figure of dislocation at the borders of the West.

Locality echoes limitation and limitation's limitation. It multiply resists totality and infinity, but not through limitation without qualification. Rather, it incessantly questions the limits of its own limits and the authority of its self-representations. The limitation appears incompatible with the absoluteness of totality and infinity; the limitation of limitation appears incompatible with the absoluteness of limitation. Absoluteness here presents itself without limit. Must we accept that presentation without aporia? Or may we recall that the absolute cannot present itself absolutely, how it may be rehabilitated in relation to multiple reflexivity? The limitation of limitation limits absolutely, but the absoluteness echoes its locality. The absoluteness echoes aporia; its univocity echoes discordance.

How may we represent the limits of reflexivity except in archaic terms, returning to a more innocent time where reflexivity echoed its limits but not the limits of those limits, or in a less reflexive culture without multiple reflexivity? Reality frequently resounds in anachronistic form, its reflexivities unknown to itself. Yet even here we find countermovements, in "superrealistic" art for example, where reality echoes its multiple reflexivity. May there resound a reality innocent of its forms of representation and a reality that echoes the limits of its representations? If so, do these realities sound indistinguishable—another expression of multiple reflexivity? Before reflexivity echoed its multiple reflexivities, Dewey addressed this question of reality: "The chief characteristic trait of the pragmatic notion of reality is precisely that no theory of Reality in general, *überhaupt*, is possible or needed. . . . "reality" is a *denotative* term, a word used to designate indifferently everything that happens."³¹ The "everything" here echoes its multiple reflexivities. Reality includes and limits itself, calls its own reality into question.³² Nature includes its artifices within itself as its "ergonality," its work.

The locality of multiple reflexivity echoes the aporia that within historical memory we cannot regain a state without memory. Yet while we cannot think of being outside history from within it, we may lose a sense of history from within and a sense of our history from without. The limits of history resound marked by

sacrifice. In the extreme, history itself may disappear, a sacrifice to the power of the future to sacrifice sacrifice. "Rather, historicism that takes itself seriously will allow for the fact that one day its thesis will no longer be considered true, ie that people will think 'unhistorically.'" ³³ Gadamer adds, "And yet not because the unconditioned assertion of the conditioned character of all knowledge is not meaningful, containing a logical contradiction." ³⁴ We may hear the end of history not as a logical contradiction, under *technē*, but the historical sacrifice of history.

Among the many ways to question history's sacrifice, two forcibly resound: multiple reflexivity may contain its limit so that from within, after Gadamer, it may be dissolved; or multiple reflexivity may repeat its limit, so that it can never completely be thought or realized, but always belongs to multiple deferrals within and without. Following the first alternative, we would hold, however aporetically, that multiple reflexivity will someday dissolve, after our modernity, in a loss that will include the sacrifice of history. For without such sacrifice, we would always remember modernity with its multiple reflexivities. Multiple reflexivity here contains the limits of its own history, the possibility of history destroying itself.

Following the second alternative, we would hold that multiple reflexivity echoes the efflorescence and limitation of every limit, including its own. The locality of locality can "only" be thought in local terms, but cannot be forgotten either, cannot disappear without a whimper. Locality unfolds successively, recurrently, circularly, and interminably; reflexively and reflexively reflexively. Its locality entails its self-deferral. The locality of locality murmurs its own deferral, the cacophony of nature's *technē*.

Locality suggests that we grant neither alternative privilege. Each reverberates as the other's other, questions its limits, and our sonorescence both dissolves multiple reflexivity into the flat terrain of diminished sensibility and deepens it with more complex circularity. The circling of reflexivity around itself enriches and displaces it. As a consequence, the locality of locality inhabits the regions in which the play of deferral and univocity may resound. Locality's locality exceeds any form, any measure, exceeds itself.

We are asking how locality may escape the dominion of totality and how universality may escape the dominion of infinity, each echoing excess. We are pursuing the thought that locality might resound everywhere while not "all there is" nor relevant to "everything in every way." And if locality does not pertain to everything in every way, it may not pertain to everything in its many ways. Everything univocally sounds a transgressive figure within locality whereby it dislocates itself.

When Foucault claims that "power is everywhere," he adds that "this is not because it includes everything but because it comes from everywhere." It comes from everywhere to the extent that it includes resistances, and these dislocate it. This relation of power and resistance echoes deferral in both directions: power

defers itself as resistance; resistance relates to power by deferral. Deferral calls forth a double movement of transgression, echoes unending questions and more questions. Everything and totality sound their transgressiveness, with locality, inexhaustibility, and the absolute, echoing the limits of their limits.

We are exploring a sonorescent representation of locality, of *place*, where locality's locality echoes the limits and work of place. We join two thoughts in Aristotle's *Physics*:

things which exist are *somewhere* . . .³⁵

nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest . . . in virtue of itself. . .³⁶

Nature moves of itself, from somewhere to elsewhere, where somewhere and elsewhere echo order together with disorder. What belongs somewhere echoes locally in place, but within itself, within its locality, belongs inexhaustibly elsewhere, works in many places. The movement echoes desire; the relevance of elsewhere echoes power; the reflexivity echoes representation; representation performs its work. Locality echoes multiply in virtue of its locality, a locality of representativity and ergonality.

Power, desire, and representation compose a triangle chiming locality and inexhaustibility, locality's excess, echoing locality's inexhaustibility and inexhaustibility's locality as their ergonality, excesses exceeding and dislocating themselves. Power, desire, and representation resound in our sonorescence as locality, inexhaustibility, and ergonality, echoing relevance and excess. Locality here repeats and displaces place, its order and disorder, places place at risk elsewhere. Locality's locality, its excesses and inexhaustibility, places metaphysics and science at risk through their ergonality. Whatever their truth, it echoes in virtue of their ergonality, the local and inexhaustible work they do. We seek to represent power, desire, and representation locally and excessively where the excesses reverberate together as their ergonality, and where ergonality resists metaphysical authority. We confront the question of how our local representations may exceed themselves, may place themselves at risk, how the work of representation may risk incessant danger.

Locality's locality echoes in place where each location works, is relevant, elsewhere, in other places, each location exceeding itself. The displacement of language echoes at the heart of our sonorescence. We sound our univocal names clattering all at once, chattering their multiple locality among themselves, echoing their ergonality. These univocal sonorescences of locality and inexhaustibility represent their ergonality, dismantling any privilege, even their own.

A locus, located and locating, in spheres of relevance: a *locale* of its *ingredients*; an ingredient of other locales.

An ingredient, one among many other ingredients in a locale: as one, a *unison* with many *resonances*, the other ingredients relevant to it in that locale. A unison including many other unisons: a *superaltern unison* located in a *superaltern locale*.

An ingredient with a superaltern unison in a superaltern locale *belongs* there, otherwise it *departs*. Every ingredient belongs to and departs from any of its locations in *harmony* and *disharmony*.³⁷

An ingredient together with other alternatives ingredient in a locale: such an ingredient works there in *polyphony*, otherwise in *stillness*, lacking possibilities. Every ingredient echoes stillly and polyphonically in any of its locations.³⁸

A locus comprises a locale of relevance for its ingredients and works in many other locales as ingredients among their other ingredients. As locale-ingredients together, a locus does its work, does different and conflicting work, wherever located. The univocals reverberating in our sonorescence, with their proliferating prepositions (in, of, for, by, et cetera, always et cetera), represent inexhaustibly different ergonalities of location, multiple workings in place, frame different representations of order and disorder, locality and excess: a locale of ingredients, an ingredient in a locale, many locales; a unison composing an ingredient's unitariness in a location, other relevant ingredients its multiple resonances in that location; a superaltern unison including many subaltern unisons, each unison working somewhere as superaltern, elsewhere as subaltern; each ingredient with a superaltern unison belonging in that location, otherwise departing, harmonious and disharmonious; ingredients working together as polyphonic alternatives in a location, otherwise still in their location; always other locations. Order and disorder belong together as multiple location, locality and inexhaustibility, concord and discord. Locality and inexhaustibility belong together in virtue of their ergonality, each echoing the other displaced by work in other locations. Locality echoes ergonality, the different work that loci and ingredients do in different locations, where no single or overarching location, no totality, defines a locus's work. Its work comprises its inexhaustible multiplicities, excesses of locality and their locality, multiple representations of order and disorder and their representativity.

A locus—the proximity of locale and ingredient—belongs to many local spheres of relations and comprises a local sphere of relations for others. The locality, pervasive and everywhere, repudiates totality: no overarching location delimits a locus, no supreme superaltern unison. The inexhaustibility, pervasive and everywhere, calls for displacement, echoes further locations with their excesses. The ergonality, pervasive and everywhere, repudiates univocity, sounds the limits of every limit, including the limits of its own univocities. For any unison, in any location, multiple resonances resound exceeding any relation. For any super-

altern unison, a locus belongs to many other locations exceeding any identity. Among the other ingredients in a locale, an ingredient echoes stillness and polyphony, each exceeding the other in that locale, together expressing excesses in relation to other locales. Locality echoes relevance as power, each exceeding, resisting, itself; inexhaustibility echoes excess, each exceeding itself; ergonality works as representation, exceeding itself as representation. The multiple localities of power appear as excesses in which representation exceeds its representativity.

How shall we hear the reverberations of this univocal discourse? We may hear the proximity of Aristotle's categories, locale and ingredient as substance and accident, unison and resonance as one and many, harmony and disharmony as identity and difference, stillness and polyphony as actuality and possibility, rest and motion. How shall we hear the differences? The sound, the music, of nature's sonance echoes an ergonality that does not repeat *technē*, does not resonate as instrumentality or form, norm or rule. Rather, each univocal departs from wherever it belongs, departs from norm or rule while it belongs together with them. Each of the sonorescent univocals expresses location and the limits of that location. Locality's locality resounds through each pair of sonorities as inexhaustibility, deferral's deferral, echoes nature's *ergon*.

Each of the sonorities echoes excess, and each of the pairs echoes further excesses. The togetherness of locale and ingredient within each locus echoes its proximity to other locales, belonging together with them, but every belonging departs. This disharmony echoes ergonality, refuses the totality of nature under any representation, material or spatial, even local. A locus works somewhere, many wheres. In its many locations, it belongs and it departs, and no totality of all locations composes it, no totality of work exhausts it. Harmony and disharmony express the inexhaustible proximities of loci among themselves and to us. Stillness and polyphony express the inexhaustible determinations and excesses of possibility, the want of necessity in necessity. Unison and resonances doubly echo the excesses of identity and propriety throughout inexhaustible locations. Each pair of sonorities sounds a certain proximity of determination and excess. Each exceeds the others and itself.

Excess echoes here in two pervasive ways. One is the ergonality of every sonority, of every locus, representing the inexhaustible locations to which it belongs. The second, refusing totality, echoes the intransitivity of location. Locality and relevance demand intransitivity, repudiate infinite chains of relevance composing totality. Transitivity constitutes a total measure, each locus relevant to another, that locus relevant to a third, and so forth, the first thereby relevant to every other. Locality and ergonality entail no supreme harmony, no great chord, of relevance, transitivity, or power. Intransitivity represents excess.

The reciprocity, multiplicity, and intransitivity of relevance echo the principle that power is everywhere, dislocated by resistances. If power materializes as

local, everywhere, it cannot materialize as everything, always echoes the discords of reciprocity. Relevance materializes everywhere—equivalent with locality—displaced by other relevances. The everywhere belongs with intransitivity, surrounded by unending possibilities. Its univocity represents resistance to authority including the authority of every resistance.

If we associate relevance with power, then power appears to echo generically, defining representation and desire.³⁹ Yet how can power materialize as the defining idea of locality without excluding resistances in relations of power to desire and truth, without excluding the pervasiveness of representation and desire? How can the truth of relevance be heard except as a local truth, limited and dislocated by representation and desire? The question unfolds whether the truth of the multiple reflexivities of locality and inexhaustibility is defined by Western culture, embodied in the irrelevance of philosophy's history to a future pervaded by unending stories it tells to its futures of the nature of relevance. The alternative unfolds that the univocity of being rings out unending univocities, unending deferrals, echoing here as locality, inexhaustibility, and ergonality; as power, desire, and representation; as locale-ingredient, unison-resonance, harmony-disharmony, stillness-polyphony; and more. Locality, inexhaustibility, and ergonality represent respectively power as relevance, desire as excess, and representation as nature's work, as the sonorous pairs represent their own locality, inexhaustibility, and ergonality, each echoing deferral and excess.

The traditional metaphysical voice speaks of reality without speaking of its own reality. The transcendental turn, in turning back onto itself, repudiates that voice as unreflexive. The multiple reflexivity that emerges turns representation back onto itself, questioning the limits of that repudiation. Among the forms in which this multiple limitation may be questioned resound the midworlds of representation, power, and desire, the sites of history, practice, and humanity. Our sonorescence includes, within its reflexivities, pervasive representations of these other movements. Our sonorescences dismantle the dominion of identity through the inexhaustibility of their univocity.

Will those who accept the traditional metaphysical project hear the sonorescences of locality and inexhaustibility as too strange? Will those who repudiate metaphysics hear our sonorescent univocals as too authoritative? Will the retrieval of the metaphysical project within its critique be heard as too dangerous or too familiar? In every case, the danger and familiarity place themselves at risk. The Master's voice finds its authority broken, its rule heterogeneous, under any authority. The risk under which we place ourselves dismantles His (and Our) authority from within and without, echoing the disharmonies of repetition and the repetitions of the others. We sound a metamusical sonorescence that would repudiate every authority, even that of Being, without reinstating another privilege, even the privilege of the Other.

Representation inhabits the spaces between locality and our local sonorescences, between nature and artifice. We might call it the “ontological difference,” asking why that difference should be inhabited by representation. One answer is given by Peirce, who defines a sign as “a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its *Object*, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its *Interpretant*, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same object.”⁴⁰ No interpreter is mentioned. There could be no interpretants without subjects, but not all interpretants present themselves to individual human beings. Many unfold as institutional, habitual, communal, public. Interpretants play the role of thirds to signifiers and signifieds, their mediation and their dislocation. Thirdness plays the role of mediation and excess, deferral and its deferral. Unending thirds of thirds in Peirce, endless interpretants of interpretants, echo representations of representation.

Our sonorities resound in pairs: locale-ingredient, unison-resonance, harmony-disharmony. Between and among them echoes Peirce’s thirdness. It may be identified with representation, its materiality with ergonality. Thirdness echoes harmony and disharmony. The harmony and disharmony of harmony and disharmony echoes representation’s representation. The third of thirds sounds the music of multiple sonorescence.

The association of power, desire, and representation with locality, inexhaustibility, and ergonality, respectively, appears to represent their essences without excess. Yet they have no essences, or have displaced, excessive essences. The locality of such excesses suggests that these univocities exceed themselves, including the locality of their historical situatedness. Power, desire, and representation peel forth as representational sites at which the locality of multiple reflexivity resounds in endless counterpoint. This refrain suggests that our sonorescence belongs to our modernity and might be associated with different sites in another time’s modernity. It suggests as well that our sonorescence echoes unending interrogation and discordance.

We hope to hear the pairs of univocals as representations of deferral, pervasive together, complementarily, and unintelligible separately. They chorus forth to ring nature’s sonances and the aporias that express its dissonances. Here there resounds no unitary sense or representation of nature, but many that coexist, conflict with, interrogate, and exceed each other. Here there echo many timbres of reality and nature—many realities and natures—and their refrains. Nature rings in our representation as a locale and as an ingredient; as a unison and as many resonances; as a superaltern unison and as many superaltern resonances; harmony and disharmony; stillness and polyphony. All echo contrapuntal motifs of deferral, rung on one side as nature’s *technē*, on the other as the music of our sonorescence.

Our tradition, Foucault points out, rests on the Law, whose mark is exclusion and prohibition.⁴¹ Disciplinaryness marks that sense of law, excluding what

is not “within the true.”⁴² That a discipline, even one like philosophy, might define the true as if without deferral demands exclusion of what unfolds outside that truth. Foucault suggests that such prohibition and exclusion are not intrinsic to power or desire, that the question for us is why the West, in its deployment of power, should have exercised tactics of exclusion and prohibition.

Following this line of thought, we may question not so much whether philosophy and its tradition have transpired as monolithic and imperial, but why they have been heard as such repeatedly, neglecting their displacements and aporias;⁴³ why the predominance of a disciplinary tradition has been assigned precedence over its recessions; why the story of metaphysics has repeatedly been unifying, even unitary, while alternative stories of its divisions and uncertainties have been suppressed; even why (and how) the suppression has taken place in the full light of day, not by causing alternative readings in the tradition to disappear, for they are readily accessible, but by causing them to be irrelevant; why the appeal of metaphysics has repeatedly sounded in the form of a refrain, governing truth and being without deferral; whether the repudiation of metaphysics repeats metaphysical exclusion without deferral.

Power materializes everywhere, dispersed by resistances. Locality unfolds as pervasive relevance, dispersed by inexhaustibility. The sense in which a philosophical truth might be relevant everywhere appears totalizing, without deferral, where it does not include its other, which dislocates it, and does not interrogate itself. Yet no effective history, no tradition, can fail to represent what unfolds as relevant and irrelevant within it without deferral. Is this not perhaps the greatest of Hegel’s insights, conjoined with the drastic suggestion that relevance and irrelevance are teleological, a notion of deferral that lacks its own deferral?

Our local sonorescence echoes as an inexhaustible site of deferral and interrogation—but not the “only” such site. Nature and its representations—its truths—resound dispersed by the sonorities that represent their representation. No single sense of reality resounds nor a single sense of its representational conditions. In part this silence manifests the discordant nature of representation, in part the dissonances of reality and truth. These terms, being, nature, reality, truth, representation; but also, locality, inexhaustibility, ergonality, ring diaphonic echoes of each other, each hidden from the others while sounding them forth. The distortions of the reverberations may be heard as its truths.

Power, desire, and representation call forth the local sites at which the aporias of truth and reality emerge. History, practice, and embodiment ring among the pervasive fields of modern representation in which humanity encounters nature. It follows that power, desire, and representation inhabit the spaces in which our bodies participate in history and practice. Our bodies occupy physical spaces within history and politics, dance to the ring of their representation. This embrace of embodiment within representation keeps philosophy material.

Locality, in its sonorescent representations, including the univocals but also the representations that displace them and represent their dislocations, echoes unending questions of the reflexivities of representation, desire, and power, of the multiple reflexivities of inexhaustibility. The truth of nature sounds its reflexivities both because truth and nature echo reflexivity and because the territory between them is occupied by our reality. Our reality echoes its locality, and no firm opposition between reality and unreality resounds within it. The multiple reflexivities of reality include the reflexive unrealities within it, where each reflexivity dislocates the others, representing within each departure its departures from itself. In this way, reality remains reality as much as it changes, and changes as much as it remains the same. Similarly, multiply reflexive representation remains representation even as it echoes misrepresentation. Each sounds its locality and inexhaustibility. Each disperses and includes its others.

Speaking of truth and knowledge rings of representation. Yet despite our multiple representations of the percussions and repercussions that echo between reality and truth, this figure represents representation and its deferrals locally, in a certain way. We may seek another paradigm of reflexivity and truth by means of which to question representation historically. Judgment tolls as the traditional Western representation of the midworlds in which truth and nature resound. It rings between reality and representation. Local judgment occupies a site of deferral at which, pervasively, locality and inexhaustibility meet the ring of their representations.