Introduction

Hegel and the Other

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In recent years, a dominant theme has emerged in discussions among Hegelians, Hegel scholars, and exponents of contemporary continental philosophy. How does Hegel deal with difference or the other? The question arises not only about the way difference fits into the Hegelian whole but also about the way Hegel deals with philosophies that are not his own and the way he takes over areas of human life that are not properly philosophical. The essays in this collection deal with these issues as they arise in Hegel's treatment of the modern world. "The modern world" here refers only to the part of the modern world that immediately precedes and serves as the context for Hegel himself, the world of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe.

Human beings, especially philosophical human beings, deal with what is other or different in several ways. One approach we call a confrontation. In confrontation, difference dominates the relation between the participants. Each expresses his or her position, argument, cause, or values in the form of a challenge, as something opposed to what the other stands for. In a confrontation, the participants try to overcome the other with the superior force of their principles, or one position tries to assert superiority while the other tries to hold its own against it. Confrontation limits those involved in it. The participants see the other as something to be set aside, eliminated, rendered inoperative. Each defines her or his position as excluding the position of the other. As a result the other represents an alternative that the position asserted against it cannot claim as its own.

The limiting aspect of confrontation distinguishes it from another way of relating to what is other, which we call appropriation. This kind of relation shows itself most clearly in property ownership and work. Natural things as they arise in the natural order have their own way of being and their own dynamic, which does not immediately fit in with the life plans of human beings. Human beings make these things part of their own purposes by taking possession of them, by adapting them to human interests, by using them to accomplish human goals. As a result one participant in the relation, the human participant, adds something new to what he or she is. For example, the machinery used in industry adds to the human worker a power and strength that the worker does not have when working without it; and the land claimed as property adds to the human owner a natural environment in which to live and work. Thus, the human participant in property ownership and work takes the otherness of natural things into his or her own way of being. But in the process, natural things lose the role proper to them as participants in an independent natural order and take on the role given to them by the one who has appropriated them.

Appropriation operates not only in relations between human life and natural things but also in relations between one form of human life and another. One philosophical position appropriates another; or philosophy appropriates another form of knowledge, e.g. knowledge embedded in ordinary experience or derived from empirical science. In this way of relating to the other, the philosopher brings the knowledge proper to the other into his or her own position. But in the process the knowledge appropriated loses the role proper to it as an independent position or an independent way of knowing and takes on the role given to it by the philosophical position that has appropriated it. Thus, appropriation brings sameness and unity into the relation between one participant and the other. Both belong to the same life plan or the same knowledge. But this unity comes from the dominance of one over the other. One participant determines the way the other exists and functions in the relation. One participant defines the whole relation.

This dominance by one member of the relation distinguishes appropriation from dialogue. Dialogue brings different positions, causes, or value systems into conversation with each other. If the dialogue is a real dialogue, if it does not turn into a monologue, then each participant in the conversation preserves his or her difference from the other. Each remains true to the principles that distinguish one position from the other. But each also listens to, hears, and deals with the principles of the other, and engages them as different. Thus, participants in a dialogue acknowledge

the other as different without trying to set aside or render inoperative the other's principles. Nor do they try to re-define the difference between them in terms of one participant's scheme. Rather each participant recognizes that the relation is defined not by one participant or the other but by the conversation between them. In the communion of real dialogue, difference exists and operates within the unity of conversation itself.

The essays in this collection show us Hegel's treatment of the modern world in all three forms—as confrontation, as appropriation, as dialogue, and even as a complex, subtle mixture of these. Some of the essays complicate the picture by showing how Hegel deals with modern positions on the question of the other itself, so that Hegel engages the other on the issue of how human beings relate to what is other. Thus, William Desmond's presidential address, "Between Finitude and Infinity," considers Hegel's treatment of Pascal on the question of God's otherness. The essay begins by showing how Hegel appropriates Pascal by reducing his position to an element in Hegel's own. But it proceeds to develop Pascal's position as a profound human experience that escapes this appropriation and persists as a challenge to Hegelian philosophy.

Desmond arranges the confrontation between Pascal and Hegel around several themes. One of these themes represents human being as being between its own finitude and the infinity of God. Desmond shows how Pascal's interpretation of this "being between" establishes a radical opposition between Pascal and Hegel on the issues of faith and reason, despair and skepticism, existential singularity and speculative universality, equivocity and univocity. Pascal's world is a fragmented, fallen world, one which frustrates and violates the human desire for truth, justice, happiness, and peace. In this world, we know God only as absent. While Hegelian reason conquers the abyss between human finitude and the infinity of God, the Pascalian heart knows this as an abyss that cannot be overcome. Desmond himself challenges both Pascal and Hegel, calling for a position that does not disparage the speculative universal and yet does not fail to appreciate the momentousness of the this-here-now. Thus, the essay ends with three forms of "being between." Desmond turns Hegel's appropriation of Pascal into a "being between" that preserves both Pascal and Hegel, and preserves them in opposition and confrontation. Desmond's own position suggests a "being between" that reconciles Pascal and Hegel. Let me suggest that this gives us a "being between" the Pascal-Hegel opposition and the Pascal-Hegel reconciliation, which imitates a structure that appears regularly within Hegel's own system.

Cyril O'Regan, in "The Religious and Theological Relevance of the French Revolution," continues the theme of a fallen world by asking whether the French Revolution is an interruption, an unintelligible happening that threatens the fundamental intelligibility of history. Hegel's early treatment of the French Revolution focuses on the essential values of the Revolution and treats the Terror as not belonging to the basic plot played out in the actualization of these values. In the *Phenomenology*, however, the Terror becomes an essential element in this plot development and hence counts as part of what defines the French Revolution. According to O'Regan, the French Revolution thus represented takes the form of insanity, an unreason that renders discourse impossible, an apocalyptic event that no concept could tranform into sense. O'Regan examines this issue in the context of another debate, one that asks whether the French Revolution, as Hegel interprets it, belongs primarily to the history of politics or the history of religion. O'Regan claims that Hegel's later handling of the French Revolution situates it within the history of religion; and this solves the problem of the Terror. Confronted and challenged by reason's other, an insane unaccountable *novum*, Hegelian thought re-defines this other as an element in the rational development of Christianity.

George di Giovanni, in "Hegel, Jacobi, and Crypto-Catholicism," identifies the historical context for Hegel's account in the *Phenomenology* of the encounter between the values of Enlightenment reason and those of religious belief. Finding Jacobi as a main character in this setting, the essay casts Jacobi as Hegel's defender of historically-based religion against the attacks of Enlightenment rationalists. The essay then identifies a fundamental problem in the encounter. Each position presumes to know the implications of the other's position better than the other knows itself; each uses its own principles to interpret the other. Since each side fails to acknowledge and appreciate the otherness of the other, the encounter fails as a dialogue; it develops rather as two monologues. Di Giovanni shows how Hegel deals with this problem by giving Hegel a speech in which he explains to Jacobi why the confrontation between religious belief and Enlightenment reason is a family quarrel. This explanation adds an important and subtle dimension to our understanding of how Hegel deals with relations between one position and its other. The explanation shows how a confrontation can involve a shared principle from which different and opposed conclusions are drawn. The difference that sets one position off against the other comes from a principle to which both are committed. In this case, both parties stand for the principle that the self finds within itself a transcendent reality,

whether we call it a rational world order or God, and within this transcendent reality the self finds itself. But the parties oppose each other on the status of sensible realities and how reason exists in them. According to di Giovanni, the *Aufklärer* wins in the end, but must still learn how to meet the challenge of Jacobi's question, how can evil and error exist in a totally rational order. Hegel finally resolves the opposition by appropriating Jacobi's *Woldemar*. In this work, reason's reconciliation with the irrationality of error and evil takes the form of social bonds between persons who inevitably do violence to one another and yet are capable of confessing their wrongs, asking for and granting forgiveness. Thus, Pascal's fallen world, in all its irrationality, takes its place within the Hegelian system.

Robert Williams, in "The Other: F. H. Jacobi and German Idealism," begins with Jacobi's attack on Kantian Idealism. According to Jacobi, Idealism necessarily loses the otherness of God, world, and other persons in the constructive activity of pure understanding. Understanding knows only itself. Williams sets the scene for Hegel's answer to this attack by showing how in the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling the very otherness of what confronts the self functions as a necessary condition for the self's freedom and responsibility. Hegel's account differs from theirs because Hegel sees the co-ordination between the self and the other as a struggle for recognition, not an assumed harmony of persons mutually acknowledging each other or a harmony grounded on a pre-established metaphysical condition. In Hegel's account, the other remains radically other, so much so that the self's freedom must be accomplished in a world where refused recognition and failed freedom is always a real possibility. If the self becomes free, this freedom depends on the other's willingness to let the self be free. Moreover, the union of the self and the other does not diminish the tragic conflict between them. Rather it exists as a communion established by mutual forgiveness. Each forgives the other for the challenge of being other; each accepts this challenge as something to be cherished and respected. Absolute spirit, whether we call it reason or God, makes itself manifest in this mutual recognition and forgiveness. Thus, both Williams and di Giovanni see Hegel's appropriation of Jacobi as a radical re-interpretation of God's, or reason's, presence in the finite. According to this interpretation, God dwells in the very brokenness of Pascal's fallen world; reason holds within itself its own other.

The previous four essays show Hegel dealing with the challenge of the other as a factor in the philosophical or phenomenological development of Hegelian thought itself; and in each case this challenge raises questions about how the finite world is related to the infinity of God. But Hegelian

thought exists in a world where other forms of knowledge, most notably ordinary experience and empirical science, make competing claims to truth. Jere Surber, in "German Idealism Under Fire," asks how Hegel meets the challenge of ordinary language. This challenge, articulated by a school of thought known as 'Metacriticism', claims that reason is manifest only in concrete linguistic expression, that all necessary judgments are necessary only within the specific conditions of a specific language, that philosophical language does nothing but confuse and over-simplify the truth revealed in ordinary language. After looking at the way both Fichte and Hegel deal with language, Surber gives Fichte credit for recognizing what philosophy must do to meet the challenge of Metacriticism. Hegel's treatment, he says, fails because it does not and probably cannot derive the richness and variety of language from the structure of a systematic whole. Thus, ordinary language confronts Hegelian thought as an other that resists appropriation.

John Burbidge, in "Hegel on Galvanism," shows Hegel taking sides in a dispute among scientists. Hegel supports the scientific theory that interprets the galvanic process as primarily chemical rather than electrical. But in taking this position, Hegel does not try to derive scientific results from an a priori philosophical principle. Rather he challenges a specific scientific theory on its ability to account for the phenomena. A theory that reduces galvanism to electricity must leave aside the difference between what concretely appears in a galvanic process and what appears in an electrical process. As a result the principles of explanation become abstractions and fail to account for all the phenomena. Burbidge uses this and other evidence to suggest that the relation between Hegel's philosophy of nature and the empirical work of natural science preserves the otherness between philosophy and natural science. Natural science provides the detailed knowledge of the data. Philosophy provides criteria for the kind of explanations that are likely to be successful and for how a specific theory fits into an explanation of nature as a whole. Thus, philosophy can take sides in a scientific debate without dismissing the results of experimental investigation or substituting philosophical procedure for empirical procedure. Philosophy seeks empirical manifestations of logical structures. But it also adapts to new empirical evidence by re-interpreting the role a particular scientific theory plays in the logical system. According to Burbidge's interpretation, then, a dialogue between Hegelian philosophy and empirical science, one in which both participants retain their otherness, functions as a pre-condition for the appropriation of empirical science by philosophy.

At this point, the focus of the collection shifts. The remaining essays do not consider the way the other becomes part of the Hegelian system or even the way it resists this appropriation. Nor do they undertake to show how one position defeats the other. Rather they focus on the way Hegelian philosophy identifies itself by demonstrating its difference from others. In these essays, then, Hegelian philosophy enters into dialogue with other philosophies. Either the essay works with texts in which Hegel himself enters into conversation with another position, or the author of the essay sets up a dialogue situation between Hegel's position and that of another philosopher.

Three essays consider Hegel's dialogue with Kant's theoretical philosophy, especially on the issue of the transcendental subject. Stephen Houlgate, in "Hegel, Kant and the Formal Distinctions of Reflective Understanding," takes special care to preserve the otherness of Kant's position. According to Hegel's representation, Kant's transcendental deduction proves that the categories are derived from the transcendental subject and are imposed by the subject on experience. Some Kantians and Kant scholars claim that this misrepresents Kant's primary concern in the deduction, which is to prove that the categories are the necessary conditions of being an object. Houlgate endorses their objection. But this point granted, he goes on to identify other aspects of Kantian philosophy that are more vulnerable to Hegelian criticism. Why are they more vulnerable? Because they involve assumptions that Hegel does not make or that he challenges by taking a different position. In other words, these assumptions mark the difference between Kant's position and Hegel's: the assumption that thinking is judging, that negation depends on and does not itself determine positive reality, that relatedness does not belong to the essence of what it means to be a determinate thing, that being an object necessarily involves something given to thought.

The last of these assumptions gets fuller consideration in the next two essays. In these treatments, the issue of the Kantian given becomes the issue of the thinking subject dealing with the otherness of its object. Martin De Nys' essay, "Self-Consciousness and the Concept in Hegel's Appropriation of Kant," begins by identifying an ambiguity in the way Kant handles the dynamic of sponteneity and receptivity, identity and difference. According to Kant, identity comes from the sponteneity of understanding which accounts for the unity of the manifold; difference comes from the receptivity of sensibility to which diverse appearances are given. Yet the 'I think' or self-consciousness is one thought only by being conscious of itself in the unity of the manifold; it receives its unity

from the unity found in the manifold even if the givenness of the manifold does not account for this unity. Hegel attacks this ambiguity in the Kantian position saying that Kant does not delineate clearly enough the epistemic stages prior to thought, and he refers to the first section of his own *Phenomenology* as the way this should be done. De Nys proceeds to show how the account in the *Phenomenology* deals with Kant's problem. According to the De Nys interpretation, understanding discovers that the intelligibility of the object is derived from its own activity. De Nys applies this to the *Logic*'s account of the concept. The concept necessarily relates itself to the otherness of reality and knows this other as the concept itself distinguished from itself. Instead of Kant's two sources, one for identity and one for difference, Hegel derives both identity and difference from the same unity of self-consciousness. In this way, he makes sense of Kant's ambiguous position on the receptivity and sponteneity of transcendental apperception. The other from which self-consciousness receives the manifold is self-consciousness confronting itself.

De Nys represents the dialogue between Kant and Hegel as what di Giovanni calls a family quarrel, one in which the participants share a common principle. Although De Nys interprets Hegel's position as a critique of Kant, his discussion focuses on the family resemblance. He shows us Hegel's position as a more adequate version of Kant's insight into the receptivity and sponteneity of self-consciousness. David Stern, in "Transcendental Apperception and Subjective Logic," gives the family quarrel a different emphasis by focusing on the quarrel aspect.

Stern, like De Nys, calls attention to the ambiguity in Kant's account of transcendental apperception. The unity of the transcendental ego presupposes the unity of the manifold. Without its consciousness of this unity, the ego would be a different self for each different appearance. Stern considers this ambiguity as connected to two problems. First, the distinction between the transcendental ego, which is the condition for the possiblity of being an object, and the empirical ego, which is the self involved in a knowledge situation, does not stand firm in Kant's treatment of it. Sometimes, as in the third analogy, Kant makes his point about a transcendental condition by appealing to a condition that belongs to the ego's situation in the world. Second, Kant assumes that there are two sources of knowledge, intuition and understanding, neither of which can be reduced to the other. If intuited content and the categories of thought are utterly other, then Kant cannot account for the unity between them which objective thought requires. Nothing about the source of the content requires that it be intelligible to thought; and nothing about the

categories of thought requires that they be related to what is other than thought. According to Stern, Hegel develops his position on self-thinking thought as a way of avoiding these problems. The *Science of Logic* demonstrates how thought includes within itself the otherness between thought and being. Thus, Stern reproduces the dialogue between Hegel and Kant as a quarrel in which both participants endorse the same principle, namely a union of thought and being that preserves their otherness. But Stern's treatment shows how Kant and Hegel draw opposite conclusions from this principle. For Kant, union is derived from a more fundamental otherness; for Hegel, otherness is derived from a more fundamental union.

The collection ends with a discussion of practical philosophy in which Hegel enters a dialogue with Hobbes and Kant. Andrew Buchwalter, in "Hegel, Hobbes, Kant, and the Scienticization of Practical Philosophy," identifies a common element in the three positions. Hegel supports both Hobbes and Kant in their move to provide a scientific basis for human action. He praises Hobbes for deriving the rules of practice from theoretical principles. He endorses the Kantian approach insofar as (1) practical reason derives from the idea of its own autonomy necessary laws that govern moral action, and (2) articulates in the idea of the good the necessity that the content of human action be formed into a totality by the laws of autonomous reason. Hegel distinguishes himself from these positions, however, by identifying inadequacies in their way of rendering practical knowledge scientific. He criticizes Hobbes for his geometrical approach, deriving the rules of action from first principles whose necessity is presupposed rather than demonstrated. He criticizes Kant for not carrying out what the idea of the good requires, namely the actual derivation of particular rules and an organized social structure from the concept of autonomous reason. Buchwalter ends the essay by calling attention to the way his representation of Hegel challenges the contemporary tendency to see Hegel as an opponent of the modern project in practical philosophy.

Buchwalter puts Hegel in dialogue with Hobbes by finding a common project that they share and distinguishing between the way each philosopher carries out this project. Adriaan Peperzak, in "Hegel and Hobbes Revised," separates Hegel from Hobbes by showing how Hegel turns Hobbes' project upside down. Hobbes begins with the natural state of human beings in which they are driven by the natural force of egoism. Hobbes' scientific reconstruction of human commonwealths derives political power from the law of this force. Thus, Hobbes reduces human categories like 'liberty' and 'will' to specific manifestations of natural

force. Hegel reverses these priorities. In his philosophy, spirit makes itself actual in natural realities and in the process makes nature a dimension of spirit itself. Nature presupposes spirit, not the other way around. Only spirit can rescue nature from the violence of its contradictions. Nature cannot bring rationality out of its own irrationality. If, therefore, Hegel and Hobbes both support the modern move to make practical knowledge scientific, as Buchwalter claims, then Peperzak would claim that from this common concern they develop opposite positions on the relation between the materiality of nature and the spiritual dimension of human life.

Mark Tunick, in "Are there Natural Rights?—Hegel's Break with Kant," identifies a similar opposition between Hegel and Kant. According to Kant, human beings have certain rights that do not depend on the society in which they are exercised; and the civil condition follows analytically as the necessary condition for exercising these rights. Tunick attacks recent interpretations that represent Hegel as also deriving the legitimacy of social structures from a right that is independent of them. According to Tunick, Hegel derives the rights of human beings from their life in society, not life in society from their rights. If, therefore, Hegel and Kant both derive the rights and duties of practical life from the autonomy of reason, as Buchwalter claims, then Tunick would claim that this common approach leads to opposite positions on the relation between human beings and their life in society.

George di Giovanni's account of the confrontation between Enlightenment reason and religious belief in Hegel's *Phenomenology* provides us with a structure that makes sense of dialogue not only within Hegel's system but also between Hegel and other philosophical positions. Dialogue requires a common element. Those engaged in the conversation must be talking about the same thing. But this condition does not require the suppression of one position by the other or the re-definition of one as contained within the other and as governed by its principles. Even when Hegel is one of the participants, the common element can lead to different, even opposite, conclusions; and the dialogue can allow each position to maintain its difference from the other. Di Giovanni would say, of course, that this makes it a family quarrel. But whether this requires some larger view that reconciles the opposites remains a question for another dialogue.

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