

## CHAPTER ONE

# Categorial Form

**P**hilosophic inquiry was once dominated by two linked questions: What are the categorial features of reality? What moral difference do they make? Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Hobbes, Marx, and social Darwinists believed that answering the second question presupposes an answer to the first: human character, actions, laws, and virtues are properly sensitive to our nature and circumstances.

Skeptics challenged this link: what do we know of the external world and its constraining effects? Idealists (the skeptics' heirs) shrink the ambient world to the luminous space where individual minds create thinkable experiences by schematizing words or sensory data: we assemble words that tell a story about us and our circumstances, or—like filmmakers—we use words or rules to differentiate and organize sensory data. Experience is our product, though paradoxically the experience is autonomous. Like a dream, it may have little or nothing to do with anything external to the mind that creates it. For as skeptics forever remind us: how could we know that it does? Like the reel of a film playing in a theatre for one, the experience is autonomous. All its references signify other moments or episodes in the film: none is the effect or sign of the extra-mental states of affairs we see or otherwise encounter.

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Behavior is a part of the experience thereby created—I perceive myself to be reading what I type—but this action, like every other, has no application beyond the experience I schematize. This is consequential, for it implies that my freedom of action is unconstrained by rules other than those I use to organize my experience. This response—implied by Descartes, embellished by Kant, and favored by contemporary “pragmatists”<sup>1</sup>—is familiar but indefensible, if mind is the activity of body. For mind’s materiality entails that we humans are everywhere constrained by physical laws or social rules we do not make. The rules are sometimes changeable, the laws are not. Either way, rules inherent in our circumstances make a considerable difference to the things we do or cannot resist doing.

This chapter invokes categorial form to reaffirm that physics and metaphysics have consequences for practical life, morals, and art. It argues that what and where we are constrains what we ought to do or be. If categories are the generic features of being, categorial form is its design. Think of the architect’s plan realized in a building. Discount the designer, and suppose that reality too embodies a plan. This plan—the system of categories—is categorial form. There are seven points to consider: i. the evidence of categorial form; ii. the method for discovering it; iii. Kantian objections to the realist, essentialist implications of categorial form; iv. a sketch of plausible candidates; v. antecedent formulations; vi. practical implications; and vii. a question: which hypothesis about categorial form is best?

### 1. Evidence of Categorial Form

No one lives through a waking day without engaging some or all of the principal features of categorial form. These experiences are practical and parochial: our understanding of bodies, space, time, and motion is calibrated to the scale of middle-sized things moving at relatively low velocities. Hypotheses about categorial form would be crippled were we to stop with these first approximations. We elaborate, revise, and sometimes replace them with the hypotheses of empirical science: they have the scope, economy, and depth appropriate to our inquiry. Yet, science is not the last word about categorial form. Aristotle’s remark—that sciences invoke causality without explaining it—is still pertinent. Scientists are careful to explicate some features of categorial form—mass and space-

time, for example—but casual about others. The status of laws may be the signature example of our time: scientists discover and cite them without specifying their place in nature. Philosophers of science gloss the issue by identifying natural laws with sentences or equations, but laws have a regulative force that is unexplained by any feature of these inscriptions.<sup>2</sup>

Who worries about the ontological status of laws? Who formulates and tests notions of categorial form when science and practical reflection decline the responsibility? Only philosophers, and especially metaphysicians. This is our defining task, though we often disqualify ourselves in three ways: we ignore the work for the good reason that it is difficult; we are too often apriorists who don't know how to use the empirical information supplied by practical life and science; and we have devoted ourselves, for 2500 years, to two, sterile projects, one theological, the other mentalistic. Rational theology proposes that God is the capstone, necessary ground, or container for all Being. It usually ignores the natural world, while adducing no evidence or compelling argument to justify its claims about God's character or existence. The other failed project is mentalism. Making nous or the cogito the ground for Being, it says that nothing is better known to mind than mind itself, including mind's structure and ideas. Nature is ignored, because apriorists suppose that natural phenomena derive all their character from ideas they instantiate. Thinkers since Democritus have objected to this claim, but it was engineers and physiologists—not philosophers—who confirmed that being cannot be located altogether in thought, because mind is the activity of a physical system.

Theological and mentalist metaphors have been squeezed for every useful nuance. Metaphysicians who reject them look for categorial form in the material world. Our evidentiary bases are the two just mentioned: practical experience and empirical science. Both expose us to things that embody categorial form, and both provoke inferences that specify additional categorial features—universals and modalities, for example. Our aim is a theory—an integrated inventory—of categorial form.

## 2. The Method for Discovering Categorial Form

We learn the shape of things by engaging them. Like people moving without light in a strange house, we go slowly at first, learning as much

from mistakes as successes. Evolution averts egregious errors by supplying a good if partial map of our world's categorial form. But the map is generic, not particular: it prefigures an unbounded space, not the chair that trips us in the dark. Our information about categorial form is appropriate to the scale of our activities but warped by perspective. Inherited instincts are calibrated to the aims of middle-sized creatures who survive by engaging things of similar scale. Our assumptions about the world's categorial features need revision in the light of inferences that generalize, analogize, and extrapolate from findings germane to this scale and perspective.

The inferences that power inquiry are, principally, inductive and abductive. Induction generalizes: we infer from the bits we know to generalities about a domain or the whole. Abduction is conceptual exploration. Starting from an effect, we infer its possible condition or conditions. Sometimes these conditions are necessary, as space and time are necessary conditions for motion. More often, the inferences are probabilistic: we infer from an effect to one or more alternative sufficient conditions, each contrary to the others (different explanations for global warming, for example).

The possibility that the same effect may have either of two or more mutually exclusive conditions is an obstacle to theories about categorial form, because a preference for one contrary or the other is provisional and fallible. It is also troubling that suspected aspects of categorial form may be integrated in either of several ways. Is mass distinguishable from spacetime or only the effect of its intrinsic quantum fluctuations? (There was, presumably, no mass previous to the formation of particles after the Big Bang.) Even the target is speculative: the idea of categorial form—the integrated assembly of categorial features—signifies a possibility that may not obtain. These difficulties guarantee that the inquiry is piecemeal and dialectical, not linear and sure. Still, this idea dominates metaphysical thinking. Discovering any particular categorial feature, we locate it, however tacitly, within the hypothesized network of categorial factors.

### 3. Kantian Objections

Should we agree that categorial form is a regulative idea (a schema used to organize experience or thoughts of it), not the immanent design of things whose existence and character are independent of ways we think about them? Is the dialectic of categorial hypotheses a political struggle,

one whose winner prescribes the idea used to organize our understanding of the “world”? These Kantian or postmodernist objections scorn the realist, essentialist bias of my suggestion that reality has a particular categorial form, one having normative effect on every feature of being, irrespective of what we think of it. Here are some realist answers to three Kantian questions:

i. Kant argued that character and relations are projected into experience by rules used to make it thinkable. Is this so? Is every candidate for categorial form merely a schema used to organize experience?

Suppose a circle, a square, and a triangle are set before us on a flat plane. Could we perceive all the figures in each of the three ways? Remember the Whorf hypothesis: a tribe’s language determines the character and relations of phenomena perceived, varieties of snow or sand for example.<sup>3</sup> Empirical studies—of the sort my example invites—refute Whorf’s claim. People see many differences not anticipated in their languages: we distinguish shapes—faces, for example—while having no words for them. A culture or language might emphasize two of the figures while saying nothing of the third. Or we might see one as an oddly distorted version of the other two. Still, we would see it as different from them.

ii. Is categorial form merely a regulative idea? It may be. There is likely to be no a priori proof that the categorial features of things are integrated as a single categorial design. This is a question for empirical inquiry: can we establish that one or another integrative design does obtain? Doing this requires two steps: formulate a theory that specifies the categorial features of things; then adduce evidence the theory applies. We may fail to confirm that candidate theories do apply, but this would not prove that reality has no categorial form: not finding what we look for doesn’t prove it isn’t there. Kant would demur. We are chasing our tails: experience—the only reality we know—must shadow the conceptualization used to think it. Its coherence is an effect of the integrated conceptual system used to schematize sensory data; or experience is fragmentary because the schematizing conceptual system is unintegrated.<sup>4</sup>

What is the point of inquiry—implying theories revised under the press of experiment—if this is so? Why not contrive whatever consistent theories we can, showing that each may be used throughout experience? Let fiction and fantasies of every sort replace empirically testable hypotheses. We demur, because the experiments of practical life and science confirm that most conceptual systems are false: reality has a character and

edge we discover but do not make. Let Chicago's street plan be our example. State and Madison are point zero in a Cartesian coordinate system. Numbers in the four quadrants progress from there. Do I impose order on otherwise chaotic data when I go to a particular address; or have I navigated within an order, one that limits and directs me?


The paradoxes of quantum theory challenge this surmise, without refuting it. Phenomena that sometimes look like waves, other times like particles, are not concurrently (at the same time and place, in the same respect) waves and particles. This perplexity is sometimes construed as evidence of an equivocation in nature, though the history of thought, practice, and experiment suggests that our inability to comprehend quantum effects under a single rubric—one that may differ from any currently available—is evidence that we don't fully understand them. It is too early to affirm that nature does not have a single, decided, categorial form.

*iii.* Is the dialectic of alternative categorial forms a struggle for the power to impose society's organizing theory or myth? We fear truths that would restrict our freedom to do or be as we choose. We resent the idea of categorial form because it implies restriction. Never mind that we are already confined by layers of restraint, including age, gender, size, intelligence, wealth, custom, citizenship, gravity, the shape of space, and the laws of motion. Categorial form is one more insult to our freedom. Anyone proposing it must have hegemonic aims. But I do not. Categorial form is merely the last step in a hierarchy of limits. It obtains or not, irrespective of our fears. Discerning this form would illumine our situation, better enabling us to master it and ourselves.

#### 4. Some Possible Categorial Forms

Here are three hypotheses about categorial form: individualism, communitarianism, and holism. Each exhibits the generality and explanatory power required of such hypotheses, though each is the schema of a more detailed theory. The three may be represented graphically as shown in figure 1.1.

Individualism—atomism—affirms that reality comprises self-sufficient particulars. There is, presumably, a medium in which the particulars are distributed: spacetime or God's sensorium, for example. Some variations suppose that particulars are self-activating; others say that things do not move unless pushed or pulled. All agree that relations, whether



**Figure 1.1.** Three theories of reality: atomism/individualism, communitarianism/systems theory, holism

dynamic or static, are incidental to the character of the things related. Individualist theories have illustrious support and an ancient history. Democritean atomism and Aristotelian primary substances are materialist formulations.<sup>5</sup> Luther’s souls, Cartesian minds, and the free citizens of democratic theory are its spiritualist, mentalist, and political versions.<sup>6</sup> Holism affirms that there is a single particular—the whole—and that every “thing” is its aspect or part. It acknowledges that parts are distinguishable within the whole but denies they are separable. Its preferred

metaphors are organic, or political and social: separating body parts kills them or the body, people separated from states or societies suffer civic or cultural death.<sup>7</sup>

*Communitarianism* is the humanistic name for systems theory. It shares some of its claims with individualism and holism, but this is the third point of a triangle, not an eclectic stew. It alleges that “things” are systems, each created by the causal reciprocity of its proper parts.<sup>8</sup> Let molecules be our example. Their proper parts are ions, meaning atoms that have more or less than the standard complement of electrons. Ions join when one gives and the other receives one or more electrons. The molecule thereby formed is stabilized by the balance of forces—the reciprocities—that bind the atoms: each constituent binds the other to itself.

Systems are modules. Each is somewhat autonomous because of the integration of its parts, not (as in Aristotle) because of the portion of matter that supports its properties. Systems also behave holistically: each is sustained by the complementary roles of its proper parts. There is, however, no single totalizing system (with one exception). For systems relate to one another in either of four ways. They are mutually independent, reciprocally bound, overlapping, or nested.<sup>9</sup> Reality is an array of systems, some that are more or less densely nested or overlapping, others that are mutually independent. The one, totalizing exception is spacetime. Every system falls within the backward light cone of its successors, either directly or by way of intermediaries, and each is affected gravitationally by everything in its backward light cone. Communitarianism is not otherwise holistic.

How do these hypotheses fare when compared to one another in respect to a feature or features for which each must provide? Let the modalities, possibility and necessity (the *must* of this book’s subtitle), be our example. Certain features of both are common to all three theories. Each acknowledges that the laws of logic—identity and non-contradiction, especially—apply necessarily in all possible worlds. There is controversy about the universality of the law of excluded middle and about the domain of logical laws: do they apply to every thing and relation, or only to thoughts, sentences, or words? Modern thinking sometimes restricts their application to thought or language. But this is odd when these are the only domains where they are regularly violated. All agree that the laws of motion apply necessarily in our world. But this is parochial necessity. It lacks the universal applicability of logical laws: laws of motion are different in other possible worlds. Possibilities, too, are acknowledged by



all three theories: each acknowledges possible changes of position, quality, or organization.

These affinities are a backdrop to emphases that differentiate the theories. Atomism stresses possibility, hence the freedom it ascribes to every individual, be it a material particular, soul, or mind. Necessity is minimized but not eliminated, because spacetime is a necessary condition for the freedom of material particulars: their motion is a trajectory through spacetime. Souls exhibit possibility in their freedom to will good or evil and symmetrically in the necessity that they be rewarded in kind. Minds are free to reflect upon ideas of their choice, with the proviso that possibilities for thought are subject to necessities of three sorts: mind is necessarily conscious of itself whatever ideas it entertains; necessities are discerned in the invariant structures of its ideas (of circles or squares, for example), and in the deductive relations of thoughts or sentences. Each of a democracy's citizens may freely choose among several possible courses of action, though every choice is subject to the practical necessity that no one be harmed by the actions it directs.

Holism emphasizes necessity, while reducing the range of possibilities accessible or appropriate to each of a whole's parts. Each part's freedom of action is restricted, because its role is tightly constrained by its relations to others. The range of choices reduces to two: each part fulfills its nature as determined by its role, or it thwarts itself by renouncing its role. The first is necessary, if the second is self-extinguishing (hence, implicitly, a contradiction). Call this essential necessity. It compares to the existential necessity implied by the fact that no whole can exist without its parts. Here too, the negation is a contradiction, for the whole cannot be made of nothing. Essentialist necessity reverses the order of dependence: the character of the parts is determined by the task each is allotted by the form of the whole. Imagine a jigsaw puzzle. There is no puzzle without the pieces, but the shape of each piece is a function of the space left open when other pieces are assembled. Necessity of this essentialist kind is local—parochial—for its application is restricted to the possible world having this particular organization as its signature. Parts will have different shapes—different roles—in possible worlds that are differently organized. Parochial necessity is, all the while, the expression of a universal—logical—necessity. For it is true in every possible world that a whole's parts would be self-denying—they would lose identity—were they to reject their roles. Hence this cajoling, holist demand: do your part, fill your role. Be yourself when you can't do otherwise.

Communitarianism alleges that possibility and necessity are the complementary aspects of a thing's roles in systems. Pertinent necessities include the two-faced, existential and essentialist necessity shared with holism. A system's parts are existentially necessary for its creation: there is no system in their absence. But equally, a system's form determines the character and capacities of its parts: orchestras and teams lay down least qualifications for their members. For systems, like wholes, are not aggregates. The fit of their parts is a necessary condition for their formation. Fit may be static (the complementarity of parts in geometrical figures) or dynamic (causal reciprocity), but either way, fit is material, not definitional. Some things are anomalous: they don't fit. Here, too, existential necessity is universal and logical—no system in the absence of its parts—while essential necessity is both parochial and logical: roles are different in other systems, but it is true in every system that parts lose identity when a role is lost or denied.

Communitarianism nevertheless differs from holism in the relative weight it accords to possibility and necessity. Holism acknowledges the possibility of different wholes, each with its distinctive parts and organizational form, though each is exclusive of every other. Imagine, for example, the God who has no competitors; he is infinite because unrestricted. Possibility is more conspicuous in the mix of autonomy and reciprocity that communitarianism ascribes to every module, every system. Systems form, move in and out of reciprocal or nested relations to others, then dissolve. We, their human members, know the possibility that we shall participate in myriad systems, some stable (families or states), others ephemeral (conversations).

The modalities are just one of the critical topics for a comprehensive theory of categorial form. It would also acknowledge spacetime, properties of several kinds (mass and shape, for example), relations (including relative position and efficacy, hence energy and motion), systems, their hierarchical relations and emergent properties, dispositions, and laws. This is more than a laundry list of traditional, categorial features. Some are apparent within practical experience. Others have refined scientific descriptions. A few are considerations to which metaphysics extrapolates. All are topics for a comprehensive metaphysics of nature.

Is this project sabotaged by the simple objection that it implies ontological essentialism, the claim that reality has a distinct categorial form? I suggest that disparate categorial forms are contraries: nature embodies one while excluding every other. There is nothing odd about this: one

chooses the design of a new house from an array of alternatives. The categorial profile of space, time, matter, causality, and motion may be equally singular and exclusive.

## 5. Antecedent Formulations

There are affinities between the idea of categorial form and Stephen Pepper's world hypotheses.<sup>10</sup> His candidates were atomism, mechanism, organicism, and contextualism, each defended by its proponents as comprehensive and self-sufficient. Pepper believed that the history of philosophy is the dialectic of these opposed conceptions, each belittling the others while justifying itself. Richard McKeon made similar claims about the sixty-four possible theories generated by joining the four expressions of his three rubrics: ideas, methods, and principles.<sup>11</sup> Or McKeon argued that there are four rubrics—the other three and interpretation, each with four expressions—entailing 256 possible philosophic views. Pepper and McKeon may have been inspired by Kant's antinomies.<sup>12</sup> Like him, they agree that we can use any consistent conceptual system—any consistent regulative idea—to think about reality. Yet, thought's plasticity doesn't entail that reality is formless or endlessly determinable. It may have a decided form, one theory (and translational equivalents) being true, while its contraries are false. The essentialism of categorial form is no more objectionable than that of chess or this building. Each of them has an essential form. Why shouldn't reality have one too?

## 6. Practical Applications

Metaphysical theories, like practical beliefs and natural science, should be empirically testable. Testability looks two ways: to the empirical evidence for truth and to cogency. We want empirical data for our claims, because we cannot know without it that hypotheses are true. We want hypotheses that are cogent, because metaphysics serves human aims: it is one of the inquiries that tells what we are, what the world is, and what place we have within it. Kantian world-making doesn't do as much. It directs that we think of the world "as if" it has a particular form, though fantasies don't appease us: we need and want to know what and where we are. Only truths can tell us.

A true theory of categorial form would be cogent in this way: it would enable us to locate ourselves in the world. We are well located already, in the respect that our bodies have position. But this is not the sense of location relevant here. Location of this other sort is a demand we make of self-understanding. Motivated by a combination of wonder and insecurity, we want to know our place in the world. A comprehensive, empirically and dialectically validated theory of categorial form would temper our hopes, appease some fears, and justify others. Wanting such knowledge is a first cousin to religious concerns, with the difference that resolution comes with inquiry, not dogma.

Categorial form is also cogent because of its implications for moral life, though the demand for acuity is reduced. Wonder about our place in the world deepens with precise information about its age, structure, and scale: think of the pictures of dust clouds trillions of miles high, newly formed stars blazing at the crests. Moral issues also want categorial direction, but they are insensitive to many such details. Einstein and the astronomers amplified Newton's claim without altering its moral implication: the universe is vast; we are small and ephemeral. Knowing the fine structure of spacetime adds little or nothing to this sober appraisal of our place and significance.

Each of the hypotheses summarized here—individualism, holism, and communitarianism—is morally germane though mute about such details. Individualism affirms our self-sufficiency and freedoms, both positive (freedom to) and negative (freedom from). It says that responsibilities are assumed rather than primary: they don't constrain us until we acquire duties to other people (as when contracts are made). Holism inverts the priorities. It emphasizes duty, saying that freedom is the opportunity to satisfy one's place in the whole. Communitarians object that freedom and duty are not contraries. They agree with holists that we are inevitably located within networks of obligation but add that some are freely chosen and that character emerges as we learn to fill and choose our roles. The moral quality of selfhood varies accordingly. Individualism avers that each of us is self-concerned. Holism supposes that the moral vector points beyond us to a corporate reality. Communitarianism acknowledges the moral conflicts that occur when persons located in several systems—work and family, for example—choose the order and degree of their commitments.

The moral determinism of categorial form is somewhat relieved, because each form may be expressed in several or many ways. Individual-

ism affirms that bodies are separable and self-sufficient; it doesn't specify the number of bodies or the dimensions of the spaces they occupy. Holism doesn't detail the complexity of the system it postulates: there may be many parts or few; each may be connected directly to several others or to all. Communitarianism alleges that reality is an array of systems; it doesn't prescribe how many systems there shall be, the depth of nesting and overlap among them, or the number of mutually independent hierarchies.

Each categorial form is determinable. Contingencies—scarcity and crowding, for example—determine its lower-order expressions, hence their distinctive moral imperatives. Locke described a time when “all the world was America,” a fruitful wilderness where individuals did as they pleased without affecting others.<sup>13</sup> Hobbes assumed that freedom is everywhere impeded by those with whom one competes for scarce resources.<sup>14</sup> One implied tolerance for people rarely or never met; the other described the perpetual war of each with all. Accordingly, we qualify the principle affirmed above: the generic imperatives implied by a categorial form are not rendered determinate and specific, until contingencies realizing the form are also given.

## 7. Which is the Better Hypothesis?

Each of the three hypotheses has supporting evidence. All agree that what we can and ought to do is determined by what and where we are. Each implies moral directives that are appropriate to its version of our nature and circumstances. So, young people behave atomistically in the void between systems they have outgrown and those they will make or join. They confirm a theory that encourages us to behave as if we were freer than we are, until these same people subordinate individual identity to the demands of a group by marrying or taking jobs that enforce duties and roles. We bend either way, accommodating ourselves successively to one theory, then the other. But how is this possible? Shouldn't we be incapable of satisfying directives from two or more of the hypotheses, if only one of the three contraries is true? I suggest this solution. Each of the hypotheses can be used effectively as a regulative idea, because humans are adaptable: our behavior is determinable within limits.

Does this variability disqualify human behavior as evidence for or against competing hypotheses about categorial form? Could we adapt to

each form, like people who twist their feet into shoes more stylish than comfortable? Human malleability confuses the issue without altogether obscuring it. For behavior is distorted when hypotheses about categorial form are used as recipes to remake the underlying structures of social life. Organizations and associations of every intermediate sort (including families, teams, businesses, and states) may be misconstrued as aggregates bound by nothing but mutual advantage or fear. Or we may care only about the integrity of the whole, annihilating every lesser system, stifling the interests and initiatives of the people who join to create them. Both effects cripple personal development and vital social interests, because they disrupt or ignore basic systems.

Communitarianism is a better hypothesis about reality, human life and society included, because it predicts and explains the empirically justified aspects of atomist and holist theories, though they cannot provide for its claims. Systems are modular, and they behave sometimes as individuals. Systems are holistic, because they are comprehensive and totalizing, as businesses, states, or religious sects may be. Yet, atomism has no way of describing either the systems established by the reciprocal causal relations of their members or the hierarchies of nested, overlapping systems. Holism ignores both modularity, hence the individualism it promotes, and mutually independent hierarchies (Albania and Peru, for example).

Atomism and holism are, historically, the two principal ontological alternatives, because their theorists have hidden the evidence for communitarianism. Let Mill and Rousseau be our examples. One emphasizes autonomy, but ignores the families, schools, workplaces, and states where it emerges.<sup>15</sup> The other would force us to be free, requiring that we defer to the general will.<sup>16</sup> Communitarianism is more accurate: it describes the emergence of moral selves in contexts where autonomy and responsibility are acquired by infants, children, and adults engaged reciprocally to parents, friends, teachers, workmates, and fellow citizens. Atomism and holism are offsetting distortions of this more ample account. We may satisfy atomist or holist demands, but we are mutilated if they exceed the tolerances of our communitarian reality.

Moral implications such as these may trump every other motive for wanting to know reality's categorial form. What and where are we? What should we do and be? What is optional or required where is constrains *ought*? Hume's dictum—*is* doesn't entail *ought*—is true of particular circumstances (unhappiness or abuse, for example) but not of categorial

form. Imagine that we reproach a breed of talking fish: “Why not live on land and breathe good air, as we do. You ought to try.” “But we oughtn’t, because we can’t,” say the fish. “Things we ought to do fall within the circle of things we can do because of what we are. *Is* limits *ought*.” Categorial form comprises the most general features of all that is. Anything that deforms these limits, anything contrary to them, violates us. Kant, the master deontologist, agreed. Morality, he said, is the imperative of our rational nature. We want maxims that are consistent if universalized, because universality and consistency are to reason as water is to fish.

The regulative implications for law and morality are clear, though complex. Categorial form constrains what we are and do. Yet, specific constraints are often determinable: there is variability within limits. No society survives without children, though rules and customs for marriage and child rearing vary. Any of several considerations may justify a variation, but each assembly of family members satisfies the relevant feature of communitarian categorial form: each is a system; each system is a module, nested within or overlapping others.

Hence, this finding. Variability is restricted. Categorial form is both its limit and the framework of norms—the *musts*, *shoulds*, and *oughts*—that regulate motion and practice in every domain.