

PART 1

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1

LEADERSHIP AND THE QUESTION OF HONOR

Leaders on assuming office will say they are humbled by their elevation. They will thank their supporters, vowing to lead for all, while affirming that it is an honor to hold the office whose responsibilities they will discharge with care and diligence. They will declare their pride in their nation and pledge to protect and enrich it. These declarations are often dismissed as mere rhetoric, empty words ritually recited by all leaders. Yet even when not heartfelt, the expectation to display humility in victory, while acknowledging the dignity of office and pride in one's country, suggests that honor and shame are an important part of political life. Once in office, all leaders are naturally solicitous of the dignity of their followers and ever vigilant not to offend them. In democracies especially they will praise the goodness and wisdom of the people and in all places defend the noble achievements, proud history, and great name of their country.¹ All the while they will have an eye to the future and their own legacy, being especially concerned with "making a difference," standing out, or being remembered for their "signature" achievements. And once out of office they will fiercely defend their name and reputation, cooperating with historians and academics who wish to memorialize their achievements. In some cases, they will write an autobiography to "set the record straight," correcting unflattering interpretations of crucial events and major initiatives. Honor and shame thus suffuse all aspects of the lives of leaders, determining their original decision to seek office, the actions they pursue while they have authority, and their subsequent attempts at preserving their good name and reputation on leaving political life.

Of course, few of us are immune from the charms of honor and the power of praise and blame. In the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, John Locke (1979, Ch. XXVIII, 12, p. 357), one of the theoretical founders of liberalism, explains the potent and inescapable reach of what he calls “The Law of Fashion or Private Censure”:

And as to the Punishments, due from the Laws of the Commonwealth, they frequently flatter themselves with hopes of Impunity. But no Man escapes the Punishment of their censure and Dislike, who offends against the Fashion and Opinion of the Company he keeps, and would recommend himself to. Nor is there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and insensible enough, to bear up under the constant Dislike, and Condemnation of his own Club. He must be of strange, and unusual Constitution, who can content himself, to live in constant Disgrace and Disrepute with his own particular Society. Solitude many Men have sought, and been reconciled to: But no Body, that has the least Thought, or Sense of Man bout him, can live in Society, under the constant Dislike, and ill Opinion of his Familiars, and those he converses with. This is a Burthen too heavy for humane Sufferance: And he must be made up of irreconcilable Contradictions, who can take Pleasure in Company, and yet be insensible of Contempt and Disgrace from his Companions.

As Locke observes, few if any of us are indifferent to the opinion of others, especially those we respect or admire. On the contrary, it seems almost impossible not to think of others in all aspects of our lives, being especially concerned with avoiding censure. While most of us want to avoid the shame of not doing the right thing, a smaller number desire not just the avoidance of shame, but the active recognition of virtue, an acknowledgment of excellence. Some will therefore seek respect for their accomplishments in the fields of business, commerce, and industry, others as jurists, judges, or lawmakers. Still others will seek recognition as artists—poets, sculptors, painters, or musicians. But the most admirable, because it superintends and directs all of these and more, is the political. It is therefore not surprising that those most hungry for distinction will seek the highest political offices. Most if not all political leaders will therefore be distinguished by an abiding and powerful longing for honor.

This intimate connection between leadership and honor, each mutually constituting the other and thus defining the nature of politics more generally, was acknowledged at the very origins of Western tradition in Homer's famous and compelling account of Achilles. At a crucial juncture in the *Iliad*, the Achaian delegation led by Odysseus visits Achilles to persuade him to return to the war against the Trojans. They find him with his close friend Patroclus, playing a lyre and "singing of men's fame" (*Iliad*, Book 9, 189). Achilles, after hosting his guests and listening to their imprecations, rejects their offers, confiding to Odysseus a most intimate and profound choice his goddess mother, Thetis, has revealed to him:

I carry two sorts of destiny toward the day of my death. Either, if I stay here and fight beside the city of the Trojans, my return home is gone, but my glory shall be everlasting; but if I return home to the beloved land of my fathers, the excellence of my glory is gone, but there will be a long life left for me, and my end in death will not come to me quickly (*Iliad*, Book 9, 411–16).

Achilles is a healer, singer, and also the youngest, strongest, and most handsome warrior, *aristos Achaion* or "best of the Achaians," and arguably the best human simply. Homer therefore suggests that all of us, but above all those who want to be outstanding, the exceptional and talented individuals who aspire to lead, will inevitably confront this profound dilemma and choice concerning honor. Glory or preeminence seems to far exceed, if not be incommensurate with, the benefits of gain and property. We see this when Achilles rejects Agamemnon's exceptionally generous gift, which includes not only returning his slave girl Briseis, the initial cause of dishonor, but tripods, cauldrons, gold, horses, slaves, citadels, and his daughter's hand in marriage. Yet despite Achilles's initial indignation, we see glory is also unavoidably entangled with material gain, property seemingly a measure or symbol of his worth. Glory also appears dismissive or even disdainful of death, yet in longing for immortality, it seems moved by a pride in surmounting death's sting. Finally, though glory is the shining goal, avoidance of shame seems to be the most powerful motivating force in practice. This complex of contradictory longings and desires therefore makes it difficult at any one time to discern what moves Achilles's soul.

These reflections on honor, and how they will determine the choices Achilles will make, are clearly crucial for Achilles himself, but as we

subsequently see in the drama of the *Iliad*, his decisions have profound implications not only for his close friends and fellow Achaians but also for the outcome of the war itself, the larger canvas on which Homer depicts the political consequences of Achilles's longing for glory. The overall and dominant impression is of the dangerousness of glory. We see this at the very beginning of the *Iliad* where Achilles declares that, being shamed by Agamemnon, he will leave the war and return home. His desire to recover honor is so powerful that he even perversely prays for Trojan success. Achilles's withdrawal deprives the Achaians of their best fighter, leading to their near defeat, prompting Achilles's beloved Patroclus to enter the war in Achilles's armor only to die in combat. Enraged, Achilles returns to the war, creating carnage among the Trojans, killing Hector and desecrating his body by dragging it behind his chariot. As foretold but not shown in the *Iliad*, Achilles dies from Paris's poisoned arrow to his heel. Yet if the *Iliad* reveals the dangerous aspect of the passion for glory, it also shows it as sustaining nobility and sacrifice. We see this in Achilles's decision to join the expedition to Troy, his valor in war, and above all his decision to return to the conflict, knowing that he will never return to his family and homeland. But Homer's final thoughts on the passion that moves the most promising human beings is found elsewhere, in the epic that celebrates his other great hero, Odysseus. In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus meets Achilles in the underworld, where Achilles laments his choice, preferring slavery to death:

O shining Odysseus, never try to console me for dying. I would rather follow the plow as thrall to another man, one with no land allotted him and not much to live on, than be a king over all the perished dead. (*Odyssey*, Bk IX, 487–91; p. 180)

In Homer's epics we find one of the earliest and most profound reflections on the importance of honor for leaders. Through his poetry, Homer makes Achilles the preminent and influential model not only for Greek playwrights such as Euripides and Sophocles, but also for subsequent Roman, Medieval, and Renaissance measures of leadership excellence. It is fitting that it is generally in the works of poetry, paintings, and sculptures that celebrate and commemorate exceptional leaders that we find these seminal and influential meditations on the dangers and promise of honor for leadership ambition. The power of the Muses lies in animating the complex drama, revealing the hidden truth of how leaders respond to honor, how it drives single-minded and dangerous ambition as well as engenders noble

sacrifice. In attempting to understand why honor fascinates and enthralls us, we are thus inevitably drawn to the works of great artists. Thus we cannot help but reflect on the dangers and promise of glory when confronting great architecture like the Pyramids of Giza or Versailles Palace or celebrated works such as Michelangelo's *David*, Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, Beethoven's *Eroica*, and Picasso's *Guernica*.

Yet the Homeric approach would, even in classical times, confront a new way of understanding leadership that questioned its premises and challenged its strictures. Socrates's discovery of political philosophy initiated a radically new inquiry concerning human and political things. Socrates, especially in the Platonic dialogues, pursued the most comprehensive dialectical examination of the importance of honor for leaders, how it shapes their actions, and how leaders in turn educate their followers and in doing so shape political institutions and regimes. Socrates, in short, presented himself as the new model of human excellence to replace Achilles. The Socratic insights into the dangers of glory and also its potential for noble ambition, good leadership, and philosophic liberation became influential themes for subsequent philosophers. For Aristotle, the *megalópsychos* or "great-souled" person longed for honor because it is the greatest of the external goods, one usually bestowed on the gods (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1123b, 13–27; 1123a 35–125b 25). Cicero took up these ideas in the Roman context of the *cursus honorum*, the leadership career path that culminated in the consulship. In his *De Officiis* (2.31), Cicero distinguished *honestas*—honor derived from wisdom, justice, temperance, and magnanimity—from *utile* or the useful. These themes would later be taken up by Plutarch, whose famous *Lives of Noble Greeks and Romans* compares the preeminent Greeks and Romans to understand the character of each and instruct future generations on how to be a good leader. It was an education that would be endorsed by subsequent Medieval, Renaissance, and Scholastic traditions and continues to profoundly shape and define the way we understand the crucial link between leadership and honor.

Yet this influential view was opposed by a radically different way of understanding the nexus between leadership and honor. The intrusion of Abrahamic piety into politics implied a complete transformation of the classical conception. Honor was now an even more pressing question for leaders, but only because it was now altogether questionable, a dangerous temptation rather than a potential spur to nobility and excellence. As all glory belonged to God, leaders moved by the desire for distinction were now committing the grave sin of pride. Because humanity was from *humus*

or dust, humility rather than glory and pride marked the new answer to the question of honor. Christ, the Son of God, was born in a humble barn to poor parents. He was the Lamb of God, that most gentle, innocent, and vulnerable of God's creatures. And as Jesus reveals in his Beatitudes, the great virtues were now meekness and humility: "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven" and "Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth" (Matt 5: 3–10). To be sure, great undertakings were not only permitted but mandated; but such endeavors were never for personal distinction but always to glorify God: "Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven" (Matt 5: 19). As the Pope upon his investiture was reminded three times, *Pater Sancti, sic transit Gloria mundi*—earthly glory is ephemeral. The proper disposition was to emulate J. S. Bach, who signed all his compositions S.D.G.—*Soli Dio Gloria* or to God Alone Glory.²

It was in the context of this great divergence between classical and pious responses on the proper disposition of leaders toward honor that modern political thought, broadly understood, intervened and responded. Modernity too thought honor was a profound question for leadership, and indeed a variety of answers were proposed to this question. But, in general terms, the modern response took two divergent trajectories. The distinctive aspects of the first can be discerned most clearly in Machiavelli's attempt to recover classical honor but on wholly new terms. Machiavelli thought it was necessary to reintroduce glory into politics to assure good leadership, but he was also acutely aware of the danger of tyranny. His proposal to contrive the dispositions or humors of those who want to command and those who want to be left alone within a republican architecture to secure liberty became the model for subsequent thinkers such as Montesquieu, who sought to marshal leadership ambition and desire for honor as the engine for a new, finely wrought constitutionalism that protected individual liberty. This general approach could be discerned in the American founding, the first modern republican constitution. According to its architects, the American Constitution was founded on the proper use of the passion for honor and distinction precisely because "the love of fame" for the authors of *The Federalist Papers* (No. 72) was "the ruling passion of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit."

The other major modern trajectory was in some respects even more radical, questioning the goodness of honor altogether. It can be found in Cervantes's *Don Quixote*, a coruscating attack on the madness of knights-errant

and their chivalrous missions; in Shakespeare's unforgettable Falstaff, nicely poised between Hotspur and Hal, declaiming that honor is "A word," "Air" or "a mere scutcheon" (Henry IV, Part I: V.1); in Montaigne's essay "Of Glory" and Bacon's "Of Vain-Glory" and "Of Honour and Reputation." Yet perhaps no one has been as successful and influential in debunking honor as Thomas Hobbes, who in his most famous book, *Leviathan*, ambitiously claims that the modern artifice of the Leviathan state will now fulfil Job's (41, 1–40) hope of a leviathan that is "king over all the children of pride." Hobbes diagnosed glorying as a form of madness and defined honor as a measure of the morally neutral concept of power. In doing so, he provided a new basis for understanding the relationship between leadership and honor and the new politics it would inaugurate. Hobbes's influential approach is evident in Locke's attack on "dominion," and even in that great critic of the liberal tradition Rousseau, who nevertheless saw in *amour propre* the origin of all human domination and therefore corruption. Subsequent thinkers endorsed this view while attempting to moderate and thereby rectify Hobbes's parsimonious conception of the power-seeking individual. Kant, for example, attempts to retrieve dignity as essential for republican rule, while Hegel argues for mutual recognition as the dialectical overcoming of relationships of dominance. The modern reliance on the concept of honor as "prestige" and the increasing references to dignity, esteem, and self-respect show the persistence of this modern trajectory in recasting the question of honor for leadership.

MODERN NEGLECT OF THE QUESTION OF HONOR

This necessarily brief synopsis and overview suggest that leadership and the question of honor have been a significant and enduring subject of poetic, philosophical, and pious reflection, deliberation, and debate. Honor is important for understanding and explaining what moves leaders as well as how they regard and engage with their followers. Equally, leaders inevitably are arbiters and defenders of all that is honored and, in special circumstances, innovators of what is honorable and shameful. There is therefore a dynamic relationship between leadership and honor where each can be said to constitute the other and, in so doing, define the contours and character of political life. That honor matters for leaders and followers would appear to be an uncontentious, even commonplace observation, were it not for its puzzling neglect in contemporary leadership studies.

Leaders and leadership are explored in disciplines as wide ranging as anthropology, psychology, sociology, and education, although the contemporary scholarship is largely dominated by business and management. It is therefore not surprising that the question of leadership is posed and examined from a range of theoretical perspectives. This diversity also accounts for the different approaches to understanding leadership that have been influential in the scholarship, such as great man, trait theories, behavior movement, contingency theories, and more recent relational, constructivist and critical approaches.³ Ironically, the study of political leaders, arguably the origin of all leadership studies, now occupies a small part of this scholarship. This is due in part to a confluence of disparate insights that depreciated the role of individuals in politics, including the recognition of material and economic mechanisms, a new conception of "History," and the discovery of the subconscious, subordinating individual judgment and discretion to comprehensive, unseen, and often indiscernible forces. There was in addition the Comtean impulse, evident above all in economics, which favored large "N" studies to develop parsimonious causal explanations for political behavior, implicitly depreciating the role of *sui generis* individuals.⁴ We should also acknowledge the increasing authority of democratic egalitarianism that rejected "great men" and "heroic" individuals as a form of aristocratic atavism, preferring the dispersed leadership of Everyman.⁵

But what is most puzzling is the neglect of the question of honor by contemporary students of political leadership.⁶ Perhaps the question of honor has eluded dominant approaches to the study of leadership because of its very complexity. The influence of honor can be discerned in an individual's character and "personality," yet it is also unavoidably constituted by institutional structures, historical legacies, and cultural and religious codes. It is a matter of individual ambition, yet it is mutually defined by the interests, hopes, and desires of followers. Honor, as both a radically transformative and trenchantly conservative passion, reveals the potential for statesmanship and tyrannical hubris, making it inherently a question of both politics and morality. The multifaceted nature of honor means it is too complex to be captured by any one approach, so that it effectively transcended and escaped them all. The theoretical and methodological diversity in the contemporary scholarship reflects a fragmentation and fracturing of the central question, denying a comprehensive account in favor of occasional glimpses, such as the concept of prestige of institutional office, or the importance of individual ambition, or even personality types.⁷

The shift in focus from the characteristics, actions, and behavior of leaders as individuals to leadership as a relational and interactive process promised a more nuanced understanding of the complexity of leadership.⁸ Thus the increased emphasis on followership,⁹ “post-heroic” leadership,¹⁰ and critical leadership studies¹¹ showed the dialogic or “post-industrial” nature of these relationships.¹² Yet the question of honor seemed to be missing from these relational approaches. A recent work by Haslam et al. (2010), *The New Psychology of Leadership: Identity, Influence and Power*, is indicative of the promise and limitation of this scholarship. Haslam et al. (2010, 1–19) start with a comprehensive and critical evaluation of the contemporary scholarship on leadership, rejecting “heroic” approaches as “disempowering falsehoods” because they lack clarity and tend to be individualistic, conservative, and undemocratic.¹³ They argue that leaders’ effectiveness is tied to social identity so that the leaders need to be seen as the “in-group” prototype. Their actions must advance or “champion” the interests of the in-group, they must be “entrepreneurs of identity” (telling the group who they are and what they want to be), actively shaping a unique identity for the group, and they must “embed” the identity, striving toward the practical realization of the group’s goals. As the authors put it, “Leadership is essentially a process of social identity management—and hence that effective leadership is *identity leadership*” (2010, 197). Leaders build social identity by reflecting, representing, and realizing such in-group identity (2010, 205–6). That leaders and followers define themselves and engage with each other to produce a “shared social identity,” with leaders as “identity entrepreneurs,” is a valuable acknowledgment of the subtle and complex nature of the relationship between leaders and followers.¹⁴ Yet, in attempting to understand the meaning of identity and how it is constituted, the authors focus on aesthetics, theatricality, and the use of persuasive speech rather than the way political conversations are informed by the dignity, pride, glory, shame, and humility that animate and constitute all political communities.

Perhaps the most promising attempt to reintroduce the question of honor to contemporary political leadership studies is James MacGregor Burns’s *Leadership* (1979), which initiated much of the recent interest in political leadership. Burns’s ambition to “fashion a general theory of leadership” resulted in his influential distinction between “transactional” leaders, those who take the initiative in making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of valued things, and “transforming” leaders who “engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher

levels of motivation and morality” (1979, 19, 20). An important aspect of this understanding of leadership is what Burns variously calls esteem, prestige, reputation, and admiration. According to Burns,

One generalization seems safe on the basis of both systemic and casual observation: *the most potent sources of political motivation—the key elements of political ambition—are unfulfilled esteem needs* (both self-esteem and esteem by others). (1979, 113; emphasis in original)

Indeed, as we will see, esteem, status, and recognition form an important yet implicit theme of the entire work. Yet, unlike his transformational and transactional leadership, the leader-follower concept, and emphasis on moral leadership, Burns’s insight into the significance of “esteem,” recognition, and honor has not received the attention it warrants.

Though the question of honor has not been a major theme for contemporary leadership scholarship, recent studies that have focused on honor itself have implicitly confronted its implications for leadership. These studies have explored two different but related questions. The first is the question of “what is honorable,” that is, the substance of “codes of honor,” and the second is “what is honor,” which examines the passion of honor. The question “what is honorable?” has been especially salient in sociological and anthropological studies that show how distinct historical, religious, and cultural legacies uniquely color and inflect what is considered honorable and shameful.¹⁵ It has also been addressed politically, distinguishing between monarchies and aristocracies that recognize, elevate, and encourage the demands of honor; and democracies, where its prescriptions are less numerous and clear.¹⁶ These examinations of what is honorable presume an understanding of what honor is, a complex and difficult question. A number of works have attempted to answer the question of what honor is by exploring the historical evolution of honor, noting in particular its modern decline.¹⁷ Others have sought to examine honor in terms of moral and political philosophy, phenomenologically, or through works of literature.¹⁸ Especially instructive for our purposes have been those works that have sought to examine the meaning of honor through the ambitions and actions of leaders.

The centrality of the founders in American constitutionalism led the American historian Douglass Adair to initiate an important contemporary attempt to understand the role of honor for leaders. In his essay “Fame and the Founding Fathers,” Adair (1974) takes his cue from Alexander Hamilton’s

observation that love of fame is the ruling passion of the noblest minds to challenge Charles Beard and Forrest McDonald, who claimed that the founders were moved solely by self-interest, greed, and desire for power.¹⁹ Adair (1974, 24) argues that though the founders were indeed “passionately selfish and self-interested men,” they achieved greatness because the Revolution had led them to “redefine their notions of interest and had given them, through the concept of fame, a personal stake in creating a national system dedicated to liberty, to justice, and to the general welfare.” Or, as he puts it, “The ‘love of fame the ruling passion of the noblest minds’ thus transmuted the leaden desire for self-aggrandizement and personal reward into a gold concern for public service and the promotion of the commonwealth as the means to gain glory” (1974, 24).²⁰ Adair’s influence is evident in Peter McNamara’s edited collection *The Noblest Minds: Fame, Honor and the American Founding* (1999), which examines the importance of love of fame for preeminent founders such as Franklin, Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Hamilton, as well as jurists such as Marshall. Two other significant and thoughtful works take up the question of honor and leadership, though each approaches it from a fundamentally different starting point. Sharon Krause’s *Liberalism with Honor* (2002, xi) is a subtle and persuasive “excavation” of honor in the American context and is especially concerned with the role of honor in strengthening individual agency in risky and difficult actions in defense of individual liberty. It examines the various conceptions of American honor, ranging from honor in the Old Regime to democratic honor to the love of fame of the Southern Gentleman, and in doing so pays close attention to the way honor informed the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Frederick Douglass, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony. Finding contemporary alternatives to honor, such as dignity, self-esteem, and recognition, insufficiently spirited and lacking high ambition, Krause’s argument is that “a strong sense of agency is crucial to liberal government, and as long as political power is of an encroaching nature liberalism will have need of honor” (2002, 190). If Krause is concerned to show that honor strengthens each liberal citizen’s sense of duty, Robert Faulkner’s *The Case for Greatness* (2002) seeks to understand truly great political ambition as evidenced in the actions of Washington, Lincoln, and Mandela “to shed indispensable light also upon the lesser kinds, including the ambition of decent but more ordinary leaders, and not excluding that of the tyrant and the time-server” (2002, 4). Faulkner returns to classical political philosophy, specifically an examination of Aristotle’s conception of the “great-souled” or magnanimous leader whose noble ambition is subordinated to the good of

the country. He contrasts this with the dangers of ambition as evidenced in Thucydides's and Plato's account of the talented Alcibiades and Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus*, providing a detailed examination of the hollowness of imperial ambition. In his "attempt to refresh a reasonable understanding of human excellence," Faulkner (2002, 7) also critically evaluates the limitations of contemporary understandings of honor. He thus counters Adair's view of fame, based on Plutarch and Bacon, with Cicero's account of the priority of duty, critically evaluating Rawls's and Arendt's conceptions of ambition and finally retracing the genealogy of honor with the Nietzschean and Kantian repudiation of Machiavellian and Hobbesian conceptions.²¹ Faulkner's approach can also be discerned in more recent works that recognize the nexus between honor and leadership and in the process attempt to recover a role for statesmanship.²²

These writings reveal a number of important insights into the nature of honor and how it influences leaders. Foremost is the importance of honor understood variously as glory, fame, esteem, or recognition, the diversity in these designations constituting a testament to the complexity of the passion. Though honor seems to be like other passions, in one respect it is fundamentally different—it is above all a social and political passion that can only be satisfied through others. It is the passion that moves ambitious individuals who seek to fulfil their longings through public service and the authority and recognition that public offices confer. Though powerful and ever present, honor's political influence is nevertheless complex and morally ambiguous. Leaders moved by honor may do the "right thing," selflessly defending valued principles and institutions, but their longing for preeminence may tempt them to go beyond the noble ambitions of public office to pursue fame and glory at any price. The various attempts to capture this moral ambiguity in the form of charismatic, leonine, transformative leadership confirm the duplex nature of honor and its profound implications for good political leadership. The honor scholarship therefore underlines the importance—and difficulty—of understanding leadership and honor as mutually constitutive. But to properly understand this dynamic, we need to recover from history a series of profound theoretical debates that explore the nature of this relationship and its implications for political practice.

At the heart of this book is the claim that leadership and honor are mutually constitutive, so that to understand the nature of leadership one needs an overarching conception of honor, and, equally, any conception of honor will inevitably be informed by what we think is good leadership. The claim that leadership and honor are mutually constitutive, or what I call the

leadership-honor dynamic, in turn gives rise to the question of what exactly is the nature of this dynamic? Though the reflections on this question have a long and complex lineage, the diversity of the responses can be gathered and comprehended under three major approaches that have informed and continue to animate political and philosophical debates on the subject. I argue that the three thinkers who have been especially influential in shaping these approaches are Plato, Machiavelli, and Hobbes.

In part 2 of this book, “Leadership-honor dynamic,” I attempt to bring to life these various approaches and show how they have engaged in a mutual dialogue while issuing in radically different and therefore contending formulations of the leadership-honor dynamic. Part 2 therefore is of particular interest to political and moral philosophers and theorists of leadership who want to understand the philosophical provenance of contemporary approaches to the study of leadership. In trying to understand and articulate their various formulations and the way each was taken up and challenged, we bring into clearer focus three major conceptions of the leadership-honor dynamic that continue to inform and influence the way we understand leadership and honor. More specifically, in chapter 2, “Magnanimous Leadership,” we examine the classical formulation of the leadership-honor dynamic first formulated by Plato. Ambitious leaders, according to Plato’s Socrates, long to be admired by those they respect because it will assure their immortality. Honor explains the noble action (later called magnanimity) of the great leader and the selfless actions of the courageous patriot, but also shows its darker aspects in the tyrant with imperial designs and in the intransigence and stubborn dogmatism of the citizen who defends “our way.” Plato’s account was later challenged by two contending modern views of the leadership-honor dynamic, the Machiavellian and the Hobbesian. In chapter 3, “*Gloria* and Machiavelli’s New Prince,” we see how Machiavelli attempted to rehabilitate *gloria* and honor from its denunciation by Christian piety. As the only passion that was other-regarding, Machiavelli argued that honor, directed yet untrammelled, could mediate between the few and the many who make up every community. Glory is the fair reward to the few for securing the comfort and security of the many, even if in being confined within the horizon of political excellence it is less ambitious than classical magnanimity. Yet, as we will see in chapter 4, “Dispersed Leadership of Thomas Hobbes,” the disruptive unpredictability of Machiavelli’s *gloria* convinced Hobbes that honor was a dangerous passion to be curbed or extirpated rather than encouraged or celebrated. Hobbes’s critique of pride, and his innovation of amoral power as a measure of honor, was a

radical attempt to reconstitute the economy of the human soul and thereby the foundations of all politics to come. Hobbes questions the role of the great leader in the name of the individual rights-bearer who, in defending his entitlements, also defends the social contract and the welfare of all. Modern leadership can be said to have been informed predominantly by both the Machiavellian “vertical” view and the Hobbesian “horizontal,” each determined by its own understanding of the political force and importance of honor. Meanwhile, the classical Platonic position continues, in popular opinion if not scholarship, to challenge both, albeit *sotto voce*, in the name of public-spirited magnanimity.

Part 3 of the book, “Politics of the Leadership-Honor Dynamic,” tests the merits of seeing leadership and honor as mutually constitutive by tracing the influence of the three approaches we have examined in significant and diverse contemporary political contests. It also allows us to see if the leadership-honor dynamic provides new insights into understanding the character of pressing contemporary political challenges. Part 3 therefore is of special interest to students of leadership studies, as well as those who are concerned with the specific political themes and questions explored in each chapter. Thus chapter 5, “Rethinking Transformative and Transactional Leadership,” examines MacGregor Burns’s conception of esteem to argue that the theoretical provenance of his famous transformative and transactional distinction lies not only in modern psychology, as he claims, but also in classical magnanimity. Chapter 6, “Idealistic Leadership of Lee Kuan Yew,” examines the life and leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, founder of Singapore, to see if his self-proclaimed Machiavellianism and resort to Confucianism is sufficient to sustain his vision of good leadership. Chapter 7, “Flattery of Advisors,” notes that, if honor matters to leaders, then their longing for it exposes them to the dangers of flattery. It focuses on the close relationship between leaders and advisors to reveal the potential dissonance between political power and knowledge. Chapter 8, “Anti-Politics of Fame and Identity,” shows how modern politics is shaped by two contending trajectories of honor: fame and recognition. Fame, which is founded on honor uncoupled from excellence, results in an anti-politics of modern celebrities who challenge the authority of political leaders. Recognition, a move to counter mere fame by restoring dignity to individuals, issues in a new identity politics that in its various iterations—as dignity, recognition, and authenticity—seeks to reconstitute the terms of political debate and contestation. Chapter 9, “Patriotism and National Pride,” argues that pride in one’s country manifests itself in three competing notions of patriotism

(classical, modern, nationalist) that present both opportunities and serious challenges to modern leaders. Taking up the case of Xi Jinping of China, it shows how Xi is forced to negotiate all three to secure his personal and national ambitions.

In part 4, the book concludes with chapter 10, “Noble Ambitions, Dangerous Passions,” revisiting our initial claim that honor is both an ennobling and pernicious passion for leaders. It argues that adopting the leadership-honor dynamic provides new resources for exploring and understanding important political and moral questions. In particular, the leadership-honor dynamic provides new insights into the powerful passions that favor and impede innovation; a new approach to understanding moral leadership, allowing us to develop a more nuanced understanding of populists, dictators, and authoritarian leaders; and, finally, the extent to which modern democracies need to acknowledge and honor the noble sacrifice of good leaders.