Chapter 1

The Migration Experience[1]

The magnitude, directions, and characteristics of international migration change continuously, which affects the design and evolution of research and the research process. An additional precipitant of change is the flexibility that today's migrants, unlike those in earlier times, enjoy in managing the interplay of their ties with the sending country and those with their host environment. Having recognized migrants' far-reaching agency and recurrent involvement with their homelands, origin countries often develop programs to manage or engage their diasporas, meaning that they do not see migration as a one-way street. By virtue of these multiple actors, and the migrants' different trajectories, present-day research bridges diverse disciplines in the social sciences and acquires added richness and depth by using various complementary methods and empirical sources (Lee, Carling, and Orrenius, 2014).

International Migration Today

Data gathered by the United Nation's Population Division show that in 2015 there were a quarter of a billion international migrants in the world, that is, people living in a country other than their land of birth (United Nations, 2015). While some people move back to their home countries every year, larger numbers leave their native country to settle elsewhere—some because they prefer their destination country, others due to having sunk accidental roots, yet others because they cannot sustain themselves in their native country, and, in the worst case, as in the recent mass migration to Europe,

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many due to ongoing warfare or residence in failed/failing states. These migration flows take place between a diverse set of origin and destination countries, some in the same continent and others across continental borders (Arango, 2000). What some people see as sending countries are preferred destinations for others, as the case of Germany exemplifies (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015). All countries around the globe participate in in- and out-migration (hence the "globalization" of migration), creating a complex fabric of sizes and directions of international population movements (Castles, De Haas, and Miller, 2009; Papastergiadis, 2000; Winders, 2014). Nevertheless, the main flow of international migration is from a large number of less-developed countries to selected industrialized and wealthy countries (South/East-North/West migration) (Czaika and De Haas, 2014; Morawska, 2012; Skeldon, 1997; Zolberg, 1999). The more developed a country is and the higher the standard of living it offers, the larger is the share of its foreign-born population (de Haas, 2010). In general, while in Oceania, North America, and Western Europe the foreign-born constitute between one-tenth and two-tenths of the local population, in Africa, Asia, and Latin America their proportion is less than 2 percent (United Nations, 2015).

Migrants are not cut from one cloth (O'Reilly and Benson, 2009; Cornelius, 1998; Higley and Nieuwenhuysen, 2009; Lee, Carling, and Orrenius, 2014; Luthra, Platt, and Salamonska, 2018; Martiniello and Rath, 2012). Some escape war zones and political crises; they form humanitarian intakes, including refugees and asylum seekers. Others are "guest-workers" who fulfill needs occasioned by labor shortages or take up jobs that natives find unattractive, for example, in services and manufacturing. Another category among migrants is that of skilled workers; found mainly in high-tech, medicine, and academia, they fill new openings in restructuring economies and are often sponsored by their new employers. There are also international students, business entrants, and people seeking an adventure or a new lifestyle who may initially move for a defined period of time but later decide to stay on, changing their status to permanent residents. Migrants may be accompanied by family members including spouses (or unmarried partners in some scenarios), children, or parents; they may arrive together or reunify at a later stage (family-reunification migrants).

The different types of migration overlap with broad binaries of "voluntary" versus "forced" (Yarris and Castaneda, 2015), legal versus illegal/undocumented (Caponi and Plesca, 2014; Fasani, 2015), temporary versus permanent (Khoo, Hugo, and McDonald, 2008), and untied migrants versus tied/trailing migrants (Clerge, Sanchez-Soto, Song, and Luke, 2017; Geist

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and McManus, 2012; McKinnish, 2008; see also Faist, 2000). Each type of migration is likely to involve different countries of origin and destination, different social classes, different relations with the host population, and different sets of economic opportunities encountered (Martiniello and Rath, 2012; Waldinger, 2011). Accordingly, today's immigrants are heterogeneous in gender, educational attainment, occupational profile, and marital status (Van Hear, 2014).

Resettlement opportunities vary in accordance with local immigration legislation. Each country or area has its own form of border control (Castles, 2004) and an immigration regime that reflects its national ethos (Joppke, 1999; Joppke and Rozenhek, 2002). Immigration policy is not static; it changes over time in response to demographic, economic, cultural, security, and political considerations (Castles, 2004; Hollifield, 2004; Zolberg, 1999); in the case of Germany, it remains impacted by the aftermath of World War II. Governmental policy, especially under conditions of mass immigration, is also sensitive to the stance of the native population (Portes and DeWind, 2007). Recently, countries have tended to harden their entry criteria by setting quotas on immigration at large and/or on immigration of specific types and characteristics (Avineri, Orgad, and Rubinstein, 2009; Bhagwati, 2003; Bonjour and Block, 2016; Joppke 2005; Yakobson and Rubinstein, 2008). Yet, other studies argue for the moderation of restrictiveness (de Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli, 2018) (see, also Beine et al., 2016). In some cases immigrants are admitted as part of intercountry acts of reconciliation, as in the case of family members of Jewish quota refugees to Germany, or due to specific moral obligations (Joppke, 1998). Once immigrants enter, each country sets its own criteria for the granting of citizenship (Castles, 2004; Harari, 2018). Sometimes governments roll out an amnesty to undocumented immigrants, legalizing their residency (Carens, 2010). Countries are not fully sovereign in matters of migration; in fact, they are largely subordinate to international treaties to which they are signatories (for entry applications) and human-rights regimes (for immigrants who have already arrived) (Hollifield, 2004; Macedo, 2007). Even so, they may turn immigrants away for specific local reasons (Kranz, 2016c; Masri, 2013) or as part of changes in the social and political landscape, as in the incidents along the US-Mexican border in the spring and summer of 2018.

Countries also differ in their philosophies of integration. Three prominent broad perspectives are assimilation, multiculturalism, and separation (Castles, De Haas, and Miller, 2009; Owen, 2011). A useful approach is that of Portes and Rumbaut (2006) who postulate a continuum from hostility

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to support in receiving governments' policies. In the modern era, Europe (Germany included) has evolved on the premise of mainly ethno-national nation-states (Alba and Foner, 2014; Tonkens and Duyvendak, 2016) while countries such as the United States or Canada have been largely immigrant receiving societies (Alba and Foner, 2014; Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 2010). Even in recent decades, relative to the United States, "European migration policies have been characterized by reactive, shortsighted measures with an emphasis on control" (Süssmuth and Weidenfeld, 2005: XI). Naturalization of (non-co-ethnic) immigrants remains problematic in Europe and the guiding principles of freedom of movement for European Union (EU) citizens within the EU remain multilayered and uneven (Favell, 2013; Kranz and Zubida, 2019). Immigrants may be expected to demonstrate strong loyalty to their host country, including, among other things, giving up their cultural and religious habits (Simonsen, 2018). The contents and structures of policy programs vary among specific facets of integration, for example, schooling, the labor market, political participation, national security, housing, religion, and sundry types of services (Huddleston and Niessen, 2011).

Accordingly, today's international migrants do not necessarily disengage from their native countries. Contemporary immigrants shape and preserve relations that connect their country of origin with their new place of residence in a way that exhibits transnational commitments (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Blanc-Szanton, 1994; Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004; Portes, 1997; Smith, 2005; Vertovec, 2001; Waldinger, 2015). This is reflected, among other things, in frequent mutual visits of immigrants to their origin countries and of family and relatives to the immigrants' new country, taking advantage of cheap and convenient transportation (Brinkerhoff, 2009; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt, 1999). Likewise, new communication technologies allow immigrants to maintain frequent contact with people who stayed behind and to consume cultural products in their mother tongue, such as news, movies, and books (Kivisto, 2005; Levitt, DeWind, and Vertovec, 2003), leading to the creation of a home away from home (Cohen, 2008) or a third space anchored neither in the country of origin nor in the country of residence (Kosnick, 2007). These patterns are supported by both origin and host countries that recognize the transnational character of their immigrant citizens and are aware of the multiple spaces that they occupy including home country, host country, and often other countries where ethnic peers have settled (pan-ethnicity) (Gamlen, 2014; Sheffer, 2003). Moreover, immigrants today operate in social structures and environments that are increasingly tolerant of ethnic diversity, notwithstanding nationalistic backlashes across

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European countries. Immigrants often join social networks based on common origin, establish ethnic organizations, lobby politically for their country of origin, and maintain religious and cultural practices in both the private and public spheres (Amersfoort, 2004; Hagan and Ebaugh, 2003; Hervieu-Leger, 2000; Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007; Sheffer, 2006). Some host countries permit their foreign-born population to hold dual citizenship (Bauböck, 2002; Castles and Davidson, 2000) upon naturalization; others construct highly restrictive legal frameworks that aim to force most naturalizing immigrants to relinquish their citizenship of origin (Faist, Gerdes, and Rieple, 2004).

Explaining Migration and Migratory Processes

Migration is not a one-off act; it plays out in several stages that evolve over time. Migrants first mull the possibility of moving and then make the decision. Next, they perform the physical act of travel and begin the settlement process in the new country, including the acquisition of human and social capital in order to maximize local opportunities and the shaping of group and national identities. Migrants may revise their original plans as they encounter the host environment directly. As it advances stage by stage, migration involves individual elements on the microlevel; structural political, economic, and cultural patterns on the macrolevel; and intervening mechanisms of migrant communities and social networks on the meso-level (Boyd and Nowak, 2012; Radu and Straubhaar, 2012; Czaika, Bijak, and Prike, 2021). Hence, migration explanations separate into a neoclassical functionalist approach, which relates to society as a system of individuals that acts to maximize social and economic utility, and a Marxist structural approach, according to which forces within the world system of countries and corporations determine individuals' behavior and are expected to create spatial inequality (Castles, De Haas, and Miller, 2009; Faist, 2000; Massey et al., 1993; Papastergiadis, 2000).

The neoclassical approach to human capital postulates that people move on the basis of the rational choice of an equilibrium between push factors at origin and pull factors at destination, which together make the latter attractive as a new home (Castles, De Haas, and Miller, 2009). For the migration process to manifest in a concrete act, the long-term benefits of migration must surpass their cost significantly (Borjas, 1989; Lee, 1966; Sjaastad, 1962). Among other things, people weigh up spatial variations in economic and cultural opportunities, health care, lifestyle, and political freedom. Cost-benefit

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considerations also take into account spatial transferability and convertibility of resources (Faist, 2000). Since migrants are often accompanied by spouses and children, the profitability of migration entails calculus of broad familial considerations, including the psychological price of rupturing long-standing contacts with relatives and friends (Massey et al., 1993).

Hence, the decision to migrate is not always made solely by individuals; instead, it flows from a joint consideration involving nonmigrant family or household members ("new economics of migration") (Boyd, 1989; Stark and Bloom, 1985). Under such circumstances, people act collectively not only to maximize anticipated income but also to minimize potential risks. From such a perspective, family resources may split, as some members remain in the local labor market while others move to foreign markets where they can improve their returns and send remittances to those who stayed behind. This model is most applicable for less-developed countries where neither governmental protective programs private insurance nor credit markets are sufficiently developed to allow economic initiatives, and where families and households are production and consumption units (Massey et al., 1993).

It is insufficient to view migration as a decision solely guided by individualistic or familial considerations of free choice. Migration is also affected by historical structural disparities of center/periphery distribution of political and economic power and recruitment of cheap labor (the "segmented/dual labor market," "dependency," or "world system" approaches) (Castles, De Haas, and Miller, 2009; Faist, 2000; Morawska, 2012; Piore, 1979). Where these disparities exist, people are forced to move due to interactions among economic structures and their fusion into global economic and political systems. Hence, while some migrants move from countries with ample labor supply to countries lacking laborers, migration in the opposite direction occurs as well: from countries with high human capital to poor countries that lack professionals such as engineers and managers and can offer them high returns for their qualifications (Massey et al., 1993). These worldwide systems are controlled by strong countries that have been shaped within the framework of the new capitalistic order of globalization (Castles, De Haas, and Miller, 2009; Morawska, 1990). Much migration in this world system moves from erstwhile colonies to former metropoles in Europe (Martiniello and Rath, 2012) taking advantage of cultural, linguistic, and administrative relations. Likewise, the world economy is managed in a small number of urban hubs, where major financial, administrative, and professional institutions are headquartered, making them preferred destinations for immigrants (Massey et al., 1993). When countries establish preferences for certain

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categories of immigrants, as they are likely to do, they also bear economic and security matters in mind (Faist, 2000; Massey et al., 1993) (see, also: Docquier, Peri, and Ruyssen, 2014).

To a large extent, what makes migration feasible and persistent are intervening agencies (Castles, De Haas, and Miller, 2009; Faist, 2000), including legal, illegal, and other actors, ranging from smugglers, labor agencies, aid organizations, and social network, to ethno-religious institutions (Cadge and Ecklund, 2007; Hirschman, 2004). Migration agencies ease the adjustment to the destination country, hence lowering the cost of migration. Where they are available, they tend to perpetuate migration, that is, broaden it into chain migration (Castles, De Haas, and Miller, 2009; de Haas, 2009; Massey, 1990). Insofar as migrants are pioneers of their ethnic group at destination, they lay social, economic, and communal foundations for additional waves of peers (Faist, 2000; Gurak and Fe Caces, 1992). This perspective has evolved into a "cumulative causation" theory, which postulates that such factors as remittances sent back home, successful integration into specific high-demand occupations, and attaining a substantial mass in the new country encourage others to move there as well (Myrdal, 1957). The flow of these migrants to destinations where ethno-religious communities already exist makes the destination more and more attractive as migrants successfully join its social and economic networks (Light and Gold, 2000), thus counterbalancing the affectively adverse aspects of migration, that is, loss of home, loss of familiarity, and homesickness in general.

Research on blue-collar migrant workers indicates that irrespective of their intentions upon migration—permanent or temporary settlement—these migrants initially become part of ethnic niche markets (Gilbertson, 1995). Not so is the situation for highly qualified individuals who are "on call" to commercial or state actors (Hannerz, 2004) and those who expatriate on their own account (Thorn, 2008). Given the temporary or undefined nature of their sojourn, typically they neither form ethno-religious networks nor assimilate into the local population (Fechter, 2007). In contrast, "life style migrants" (Benson and O'Reilly, 2016), although similarly privileged, may "go native" and assimilate into the local population with greater or lesser success (Amit, 2007; Benson and O'Reilly, 2016) or form ethnic or ethno-religious niches (King, Warnes, and Williams, 2000). Thus, all groups of migrants are at risk of emotional affects. Their ability to cope with these consequences is strongly impacted by intersecting factors such as motivation for migration, resources, education, gender, tenure, citizenship, age, and also personality (Kranz, 2019a; Luthra, Platt, and Salamonska, 2018).

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We are not always able to draw fine distinctions among the micro-, macro-, and meso- structures of the migration process. They often intermingle and generally display interdependencies (Behar, 1996). Be this as it may, all three dimensions are required in order to explain why some people leave one country and settle in another (Castles, De Haas, and Miller, 2009; Faist, 2000; Massey et al., 1993), why others wish to do so but cannot, and why still others entertain no such wish or opt for transnational lifestyles. Still, as Castles, De Hass, and Miller (2009: 54) postulate, push-pull models seem useful in explaining much migration of educated people between welfare states, while the historical-structural paradigm is often appropriate for understanding geographical moves of poor and nonprofessional people as well as migration associated with political oppression. Even from the latter perspective, according to which migration flows are guided by the international system of states, individual migrants are likely to rationally consider the pros and cons of migration for themselves and for their family members.

Notably, too, migration does not flow along a hermetically sealed pipeline from one origin to one destination (Paul, 2011). People may circulate between two countries, stay in each for a certain time, and then move on to a third country without having "one single origin and a simple end" (Papastergiadis, 2000:4). Thus, they turn geographic movement into a way of life (Faist, 2000).

Immigration to Germany

Germany in its current form is the result of the unification of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) in 1990. The consequences of the previous partitioning of Germany in 1949 remain palpable in terms of the identity composition of the local populations, the distribution of wealth and opportunities, and also the proportions of foreign residents—non-German citizens—and naturalized Germans in the respective sectors (Decker, Kies, and Brähler, 2016). Germany's foreign-born population is divided between 95 percent in the West and only 5 percent in the East (Foroutan, 2017). Expressions of xenophobia remain higher in the East than in the West (Decker et al., 2016), indicating that "diversity" is locality specific (Foroutan, 2017).

The largest groups of immigrants to postwar West Germany were *Gastarbeiter*, guest laborers, who were admitted in order to sustain the country's

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economic rebound. The idea was to rotate laborers between West Germany and the sending countries; permanent settlement, let alone naturalization, was not envisioned. Interstate treaties concerning these laborers were initiated at West Germany's request with Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco and South Korea (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and, last, the former Yugoslavia (1968). Many of the labor migrants who arrived under these arrangements came from poor areas and were unskilled or semiskilled (Aced et al., 2014). Due to the lack of interest from the German side, but also on the part of the migrants, who assumed that their stay would be temporary, integration into the host society was so slow that "parallel societies" began to emerge. They persist to this day for multiple reasons: Germany is an ethno-nationally based country and Germanness—a heavily contested concept—is conveyed by way of intermediary spheres (Preuss, 2003). Muslim migrants and those not perceived as white are particularly implicated. Their belonging to Germany is regularly debated and challenged, as much of the German population contests the notion of a "post-migration society" (Aced et al., 2014; Foroutan, 2017); although as has been argued and evidenced, empirically diversity is the norm in Germany (Czollek, 2020), and the more eager (former) migrants and their descendants want to integrate into German society, and the more active they become, the more conflicts arise (El-Mafaalani, 2018). This phenomenon has been dubbed the "integration paradox" by the teacher, cum professor of educational sciences, Aladin El-Mafaalani. Integration poses challenges, and it needs to be negotiated: Jews, and Jewish Israeli migrants, are faced with these challenges, too.

Religion is the key criteria for exclusion from German and other European mainstream societies (Kalmijn, 2015). Muslims in particular are affected; ongoing legislation concerning the headscarf is symbolic of this trend. Generally, Jews suffer from less exclusion, although bitter debates over male circumcision epitomize the construction of Jewish and Muslim otherness—currently (Doughan and Tzuberi, 2018; Yurdakul, 2016) and historically (Anidjar, 2003). This overarching trend is also evidenced in the relatively swift and easy integration of "guest workers" from European Christian majority societies. Thus, the social and legal integration of the majority of the labor migrants and their descendants remains problematic. They benefit neither from integration via religious homophily nor from the accession of their origin countries to EU membership, unlike in the cases of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece.

The most populous group of labor migrants and their descendants are of Turkish origin and are impacted by the fraught German-Turkish relationship.

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Like North Africans and other Muslim migrants and their descendants, they are affected by mass migration from countries of the Middle East (since 2015). The "refugee crisis," occasioned by that ongoing event, has allowed long-established but often hidden, structures to become visible, and to gain momentum (Decker et al., 2016; Kranz, 2018c; Schwander and Manow, 2017). Young men from any of these countries are unduly implicated, an objectified debate to date takes place mainly among experts and does not reach a wider audience (Lutz, 2017). Specific incidents are widely reported in the German media (Dietze, 2016) and acts of terror perpetrated by Muslims have led to the shorthand expression the "radicalization of Islam" instead of the "Islamization of violence" (Roy, 2017)—an infelicitous turn of phrase as the perpetrators had been criminal before "finding" Islam. These events have led to further polarization in German society and laid open the fact that Germany as a whole suffers from serious ethnic cleavages and badly managed previous migrations, and that integration needs to be seen on a societal, and not on a migrant-only, scale. Furthermore, social class needs to be filtered as the integration of skilled and highly skilled migrants (Grigoleit-Richter, 2017), and of global northerners (Klekowski von Koppenfels, 2014) shows.

Importantly, before the upheaval of German society in the wake of the "refugee crisis" that ensued in 2015, and continues at the time of writing, the 1990s also saw mass immigration to Germany. It is nearly forgotten that the Balkan wars brought record numbers of refugees to Germany, some of whom remained while others left or were forced out as section 16 of the Basic Law, which regulates asylum, was drastically amended in 1993. The early 1990s also saw antiforeigner violence on a scale not known before, as the Yugoslavian refugees entered alongside other groups of immigrants and refugees such as ethnic Germans and their families in the wake of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc (Panagiotidis, 2012). Altogether, about one million ethnic Germans (*Spätaussiedler*, late resettlers) entered the country under the provisions of German basic and citizenship laws, and received German citizenship on the basis of their ethnic descent in most cases (Panagiotidis, 2019). The existence of language and integration courses for this group gives further evidence that Germany wished to integrate those whom it defined as its own, whereas integration courses for other immigrants, including guest workers, were of little interest to the state and did not exist until 2005. Unlike the *Spätaussiedler*, who could immigrate along with their nonethnic German families, guest-worker migrants were allowed to pursue legal family reunification only in 1981 (Joppke, 1998). Until then, family unification

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took place de facto, and their integration was seen mainly as the personal concern of those involved.

Along with the ethnic Germans who immigrated in the aftermath of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, some 220,000 individuals from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) entered Germany as Kontingentflüchtlinge (quota refugees) (Haug and Schimany, 2005). This number includes those permitted to enter Germany as Jewish refugees, and their non-Jewish and non-ethnic-German family members as a direct corollary of Germany's Nazi past. About 70,000 of these quota refugees became members of the *Einheitsgemeinde* (Unified Community), the umbrella organization of Jewish communities, while a much smaller number joined liberal Jewish communities that amalgamated under the aegis of the World Union of Progressive Judaism in some states, while in other states liberal and orthodox communities exist as part of the *Einheitsgemeinde* (Kranz, 2009). Yet, it should be noted that membership in any Jewish community is regulated by matrilineal descent, or by an appropriate conversion.

Like ethnic Germans, quota refugees attended integration and language courses. However, these populations are differentiated by the poverty levels of elderly FSU immigrants, which remains an issue as recurrent debates about their pensions indicate. For the *Spätaussiedler*, years worked in the FSU are counted toward pension contributions, for Jewish quota refugees they are not. The integration of those who arrived as adults is also problematic; young "Russian Jews," in contrast, perform well in educational and professional settings (Haug and Schimany, 2005; Körber, 2021). One may reasonably ask how "Russian" these "Russian Jews" still are, as most hold German citizenship. Defining them as "Russian Jews" reflects an intra-Jewish, but also a general, discourse that dwells on creating "others" within the categorical sphere of immigrants to Germany. Hegner (2015) stresses the political aspect of the term *Russian Jews*. In Germany they are defined by the language—Russian—in disregard of their FSU origin, while in the United States they are termed "Soviet Jews," indicating the relevance of the political system in the internal American discourse.

The sociologist Karen Körber (2021) shows that even those who came to Germany as children, or who are already Germany-born children, do not self-identify as Germans but as "passport Germans" (*Passdeutsche*). Their self-identification is based on holding German passports, but being nonethnic Germans. This self-identification still occurs, although the Russian Jews of the German discourse are typically naturalized in due time. Relative to guest laborers and their descendants, their access to German society is easier,

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causing aggravation among some of the marginalized guest population and its descendants (Mandel, 2008). In particular, guest workers from Muslim countries had turned from wanted guests to unwanted strangers (Kranz and Zubida, 2019). They had become ethnicized as part of this discourse, and also as part of the legal developments (Amir-Moazami, 2018). These developments evidence the past in the present in current immigration and integration in Germany. Jews from the Soviet Union were welcome to stay in Germany, as they were Jews, and the well-being of Jews and the nourishing of Jews is raison d'être of the Federal Republic (O'Dochartaigh, 2007), while (Muslim) guest workers, in contrast, were welcome to work but were then supposed to go home. In the same vein, Israeli Jews are welcome as Jews, while Palestinian Muslim migrants are less welcome (Kranz, 2018b; 2018c). Synagogues were renovated and rebuilt; the presence of mosques remains contentious.

With these historically entrenched constructions of categories of immigrants, tensions were unavoidable and persist to this day (El-Mafaalani, 2018; Czollek, 2020; Mandel, 2008). However, another group of migrants has been entering the country, namely, people whom Germany admits not due to its past but because of its present. They are part of the "Make it in Germany" campaign run by the Federal Ministries of Economics, as well as the Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs and the Federal German job services (*Bundesagentur für Arbeit*). By means of careful prescreening, Germany strives to attract skilled and highly skilled individuals to work—and settle—in the country. The policy includes family reunification and a path to citizenship (Kranz and Zubida, 2019). These immigrants are typically given "blue cards," a specific and relatively new visa category. How many of these blue card holders and their families will settle and naturalize as Germans remains to be seen, as highly skilled individuals are often characterized by strong mobility and global career trajectories (Näsholm, 2011).

Israeli immigrants to Germany cannot be seen as detached from the social history of the wider context of intergroup relations in Germany, and German migration policies. A number of Israelis have obtained blue cards on the basis of their professions. Some of them immigrated to Germany after being headhunted in Israel; they did so not because of family ties, an attraction to the country, or sheer curiosity, but simply due to better job opportunities than other places could offer. Others entered Germany on different kinds of visas for family reunification, as students, or on various types of business exchange and settled by chance. Still, others held EU or German citizenship. The number of Israelis who renaturalized as EU citizens had been increasing strongly since the late 1990s (Harpaz, 2012), and some

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of them have indeed used their EU passports to emigrate from Israel to the EU. Yet, the peak of potential naturalizations had been reached as EU embassies reported in Israel: Germany might become an exception as the country amended its citizenship legislation in 2020 and 2021. Since 1949, Germany has allowed individuals and their eligible descendants to renaturalize under section 116, point 2 of the (West) German Basic Law. Serious problems remain within the legal realm (Panagiotidis, 2019), and have been comprehensively addressed only in the most recent past. Israeli émigrés in Germany integrate more smoothly if they already speak German or have a German partner/spouse; those who lack both and come unprepared react to the country with puzzlement, as evidenced by Fania Oz-Salzberger (2001). A commonly encountered process, even among those who entered Germany as German citizens, is the shift from specific Israeli notions of Germany to an adjustment to the German reality (Kranz, 2018d), and the country's structures, intergroup relations, and everyday life (Kranz, 2018c). Being a *yekke* in Israel is very different from being a German citizen in Germany.

Jews in Post-1945 Germany

From the perspective of the German, non-Jewish, mainstream, Israeli Jews constitute an addition to the country's existing Jewish population. That the majority of Israelis in Germany feel at odds with the "local Jews" (Almog 2019; Kranz, 2016a; 2019b; 2020b) was initially glossed over. Lianne Merkur (2019) outlined this pattern in her comparative study of Israelis in Berlin and Toronto. She found that in both cities Israelis created structures that cater to their specific Israeli—and Jewish—identity needs, which they do not see fulfilled in the local Jewish structures. In Germany, the focus of our research, these differences have become known by way of the participation of Israelis in the public discourse, which goes hand in hand with their increasing integration (El-Mafaalani 2018). These Israelis do not adhere to the established pattern of confining dissent to the ears of the Jewish community (Bodemann, 2006), or Jewish groups (Khasani, 2005).

Owing to their position as a tiny minority in post-Holocaust West and East Germany and the extreme trauma that they had endured (von Baeyer et al., 1964; Platt, 2012), Jews in both parts of the country had developed identity configurations that differed from the German majority populations (Freker, 1998; Grünberg, 2000). The boundary to the outside was imperative guarded in West Germany (Grünberg, 1988), although

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intermarriage with non-Jewish Germans were common (Kauders, 2007). These intimate, familial transgressions caused tensions in families, and in the Jewish community (Rapaport, 1997) that oftentimes functioned like a quasi-family for the first, and the second generation of post-Shoah Jews (Kauders, 2007). This scenario was intensified by most Jews of the first and second generation being of Eastern European, displaced persons' origin in West Germany (Grossman and Lewinsky, 2012), and forming a close-knit community. To complicate matters, the initial official representation in West Germany consisted most often of surviving, or returning German Jews, who, in turn, were often married to other—non-Jewish—Germans (Geller, 2005; Kauders, 2007). The eastern sector of the country that was to become the GDR was dominated by Jews of German origin (Borneman and Peck, 1995). The official line was one of ideological remigration: going home to Germany for affective reasons was part of the private narratives of East German Jews. A significant number of those who returned to East Germany, and particularly to East Berlin, aligned to communist ideologies, and sought to build a better Germany (Borneman and Peck, 1995; Ostow, 1989). German Jews who returned to the West mentioned homesickness—publicly in their autobiographies, and in research (Blaschke, Fings, and Lissner, 1997). Some German Jews who returned to what was to become West Germany were political remigrants and some became well known public figures, for example, the prosecutor Fritz Bauer; Josef Neuberger who became a minister of justice of the (new state of) North Rhine-Westphalia (Schmalhausen, 2002); and the philosophers Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. If, and in how far any of them self-identified as German, or now West German Jews, is debatable: ethno-histories that seek to understand a Jewish perspective from the inside out, such as *Jewish Salonica* (Naar, 2016), are to date few and far between. The historic work of Anthony D. Kauders (2007; 2010) constitutes a rare exception but it fills in only so much; the sociologist Lynn Rapaport (1997) evidenced an ethnicized boundary for second-generation Jews in Frankfurt, West Germany, where she conducted qualitative research work in the mid-1980s, and again in the mid-1990s. The literature scholar cum ethnographer Jeffrey M. Peck (2006) avers her finds. Yet, besides Kauders', this output is written in English and never reached larger audiences in Germany: it never became part of German discourse. More common are depictions such as those in *Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart* (History of Jews in Germany from 1945 to the Present) (Brenner, 2012), which in style also owns up to the specific style of writing history in German

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and in Germany that differs very significantly in style, scope, and personal engagement from English or Hebrew language historiography.

Be that as it may, Bauer, Neuberger, Adorno, and Horkheimer had experienced pre-Shoah Germany as part of the German mainstream. This set them far apart from the majority of East European displaced persons (DPs) who found themselves in a new society that did not welcome them and was alien to them (Bodemann, 2008). As Jay Howard Geller (2005) outlines convincingly, surviving German Jews maintained their in-group status in Germany despite all odds because they were German by way of language, culture, and habitus; they were natives among other natives. Furthermore, a significant number of them were married to German non-Jews, which had insured their survival, and given them access to a vast, non-Jewish, German family network that oftentimes supported them.

While the ideological nuances that exist within the population of Jews of German background are important to bear in mind, they should not deflect from the fact that most Jews in West Germany, as well as the vast majority of all Jews in the country, were displaced persons from Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Romania), who for various reasons remained in West Germany. Immediately after the Holocaust, many survivors fled to the British, French, and American occupation zones in the hope of safety and also for a chance to migrate to one of these or other countries. The number of Jewish DPs in postwar Germany was as high as 250,000 (Geller, 2005). With changes in US visa regulations (Geller, 2005) and the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948, most of them left Germany. When the last DP camp closed in 1956, a tiny fraction remained in West Germany (Geller, 2005). The first membership count of the West German communities, including West Berlin was 15,920 (Scheller, 1987); the number grew, and stagnated at about 30,000, until the immigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU) after 1990. The number of Jews in East Germany is estimated to be around 8,000 (Ostow, 1989). The demographic increase in the West German community should be attributed to immigration, as the population was ageing, as evident in the figures of the community membership of the central welfare offices of the Jews of Germany—an adjacent body to the *Einheitsgemeinde* (Scheller, 1987). Jews returned to West Germany from the British Mandate of Palestine, and after 1948, from Israel (Webster, 1995). As they had become Israeli citizens by default, these German Jewish returnees were the earliest Israelis migrants to West Germany (Webster, 1995). A significant number entered West Germany after the Luxemburg Treaties, hoping to gain restitution—and leave again, which many did not. Whether a similar

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movement took place in the GDR cannot be established. Yet, emigration from Israel to Poland occurred (Silber, 2008), and indeed "emigration" from prestate Israel and early state Israel existed (Yehudai, 2020).

The traumatized DP survivors who remained, or who arrived, formed the core of the Jewish communities (Brumlik et al., 1988) in West Germany. Unlike most surviving Jews of German origin, they had been orthodox in practice and much more marginal in their countries of origin than German Jews had been. The latter had become part of the German mainstream despite recurring antisemitism in the Weimar Republic (Barkai, 2002; Hecht, 2003). They spoke German, not Yiddish, natively, and they intermarried in high numbers (Meiering, 1998; Meyer, 2002). These differences triggered a clash of identities in the early postwar/post-Holocaust period already. Hoping to organize the remaining Jews and bridge the identity issues, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee supported the refoundation of a Unified Community (Einheitsgemeinde), which adopted an orthodox form of praxis (Geller, 2005). The idea that this mode of praxis would allow any Jew to be included remained a compromise unfulfilled. Filtering into the trauma that lay at the core of the community was an evolving "contaminated intergenerativity" that had dire effects on second-generation Jews (Grünberg, 2007).

The commandment to migrate to Israel became a central element within the self-concept of Jew in Germany (Schütze, 1997) that collided with the reality of many second-generation Jews who had German friends (Rapaport, 1997), not to mention German business partners and spouses (Grünberg, 2000; Rapaport, 1997), but, as stated earlier, these ties were contentious even though they were common (Kauders, 2007). Their ambiguous integration into the texture of German society as well as the ongoing struggles over the shape of the Jewish community, its form of practice, and its effectively boundaries were indicative of the permanence of a Jewish presence in Germany (Geis, 1996), which evolved into an identity matrix of extremes for the second generation. Wedged between their own wishes to leave Germany and move to Israel (Maor, 1961; Oppenheimer, 1967), their extremely strong bond with their parents (Löw-Beer, 1996), and their German partners/spouses, these second-generation Jews in Germany were often left in limbo; for many, it took half a lifetime to come to terms with their identities and find a place to settle (Speier, 1988).

The situation for second-generation Jews in East Germany was no less complicated, even though their parents had—ostensibly—returned to the country for ideological reasons. While officially victims of the Nazis

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among various other groups, GDR Jews suffered from the uneasiness of an ethno-religious collectivity in an atheistic country (Ostow, 1989), in which antisemitism prevailed despite officials claims to the contrary (Benz, 2020). While the parents may have remigrated for ideological reasons, their children were trapped in a challenging situation that was different from that of their West German counterparts: unlike the latter, they were not geared at migrating to Israel. What is more, amid the imposition of "anti-antisemitism" on the general society, Jews could obtain a pension from the state. In reality, however, GDR Jews were exposed to an antisemitism that existed side-by-side with (state-sponsored) philosemitism: while it is beyond the scope of our work, a historic account that compares the ambiguous tropes of antisemitism and philosemitism in East and West is lacking to date.

Against this background, it is still surprising that Jews from Israel were one of the largest groups of Jewish immigrants to West Germany in the years the country was separated from the East (Webster, 1995). While some of them were of German origin, other "Israelis" were Jews of East European origin who had not managed to make a good life in Israel. The historian Moshe Zuckermann (2007) is the son of such East European migrants to West Germany and he, like most "Israeli children," resented his parents' decision (Maor, 1961; Panagiotidis, 2015). Despite their umbrage, however, a share of these and other second-generation children remained in Germany. The Jewish population of the two Germanies stagnated at 30,000 in the West and slumped in the East, evidencing that in particular immigration contributed to the number of Jews in West Germany. Jewish immigration post-1945 and pre-1990, which has been oddly overlooked by historians so far, is not a new issue.

The late 1970s and early 1980s marked the coming of age of the second generation. Second-generation Jews who remained in the country but were at odds with the Jewish community began to set up Jewish groups in which they met to discuss social issues, Jewish ontology in Germany, and Israel (Khasani, 2005). They founded the periodical *Babylon*, which acted as a forum for debates of current issues, and which included contributions from non-Jewish interlocutors and experts. In other words, a German/Jewish dialogue had begun to take shape, which was fraught, as some of the missiles evidence. "Israel" was particularly problematic for these so-called critical Jews (Grünberg, 2000) within the realms of the Jewish community (Kauders, 2007) but also beyond it as *Babylon* also evidences. While critical toward Israel and Israeli policies, they remained supportive of the country. Furthermore, while having decided to stay in Germany or to return to Ger-

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many (often from Israel), they had learned from experience that criticizing Israel could very easily be taken out of context (Kranz, 2009), and that "critic of Israel" might begin with life-worldly, ethnographic depictions of Israeli reality such as poverty (Zimmermann, 2008). This placed them in a paradoxical situation vis-à-vis non-Jewish society, which considered Jews as victims and at the same time Israelis as perpetrators of occupation (Atshan and Galor, 2020). In other words, the German Middle East conflict had begun to take shape (O'Dochartaigh, 2007; Ullrich, 2008), impacting on Jews in Germany, and increasingly on Muslims (Atshan and Galor, 2020), based on the permanence of their presence. To complicate matters further, Jews who wished to engage in (critical) debate were confronted by the highly cohesive and imperatively pro-Israel Jewish community (Kauders, 2007). Bodemann (2008) argues that despite these tensions, one may speak of a Jewish renascence from the mid-1980s onward, as Jewish diversity became public again. That Jews were living and not just sojourning in (West Germany) is epitomized in oft-quoted line by Salomon Korn, on the opening of the new community center in Frankfurt, Main, in 1986: "Wer ein Haus baut, will bleiben, und wer bleiben will, erhofft sich Sicherheit." ("The one who builds a house wants to stay, and the one who wants to stay hopes for safety.") (Frankfurter Jüdische Nachrichten, October 1986, S.4; https://www.fr.de/frankfurt/salomon-korn-nimmt-ehrung-trotz-boykott-aufrufen-10997223.html). Korn, born in Lublin (Poland), entered Germany with his family as a child DP and held, as well as still holds, a number of official functions within the structures of the *Einheitsgemeinde*.

The—unexpected—Jewish renaissance did indeed happen, albeit on a small scale: Jews did become publically noticeable again—not as victims but as active players as Jews and as Germans, although the mating of the two remains an issue. The dual, if not dialectic relation, of being Jews and Germans, coupled with the matter of Israel, has created a double bind as Jews are regularly confounded with Israelis (Kranz, 2018c). While the share of respondents who hold antisemitic attitudes remains stable at about 20 percent in representative samples of the German population (Decker et al., 2016), negative attitudes toward Israel are on the rise (Hagemann and Nathanson, 2015). The Israeli/Palestinian conflict, the settlements, and right-wing Israeli policies are the key factors that alienate Germans (Hagemann and Nathanson, 2015), even as most Germans have little actual knowledge of Israel, the conflict, and the region (Kranz, 2018a; 2018c), and antisemitism had been existing independently of Israel. The Palestinian American anthropologist Sa'ed Atshan, and the German-born and -raised

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Israeli American archaeologist Katharina Galor sought to untangle some of these issues in *The Moral Triangle: Germans, Israelis, Palestinians* (2020), as they realized that "things to do with Jews," including Israel, carry a specific moral currency. Their contribution seeks to understand the multiplex intergroup relationship and evidences just how complicated, convoluted, and conflated issues are around Israel, and Palestine, in the country; although, unfortunately, key contributors who wrote in German about these issues, and who lift the local discourse, such as Alexandra Senfft or Peter Ullrich, have not been integrated into their work. These two authors, who know the local discourse and its intricacies, and how to contribute to it forcefully, make abundantly clear that Israelis cannot be considered separately from the local Jews (however much these groups are at odds) and Palestinians from the local Muslim populations (even if they are not Muslims). Thus, while their work is a first attempt that will reach English-speaking audiences, it does not satisfy the complexity that characterizes the writing of Ullrich (2012) and Senfft (2020), who engaged with this phenomenon, or of Lianne Merkur (2019), who outlines Israeli Jewish misgivings about the Israeli state of affair in fine-tuned, ethnographic detail.

Consequently, Jews in Germany, be they of German, DP, FSU, or Israeli origin, act against a historically and presently fraught background. The majority of Russian-speaking Jews who immigrated to the country did so between 1990 and 2004, at which point migration was nearly shut down. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania joined the EU that year and the legal framework for the remaining FSU countries tightened as the migration to Germany had caught the attention of the Israeli government (Kranz, 2016a). By then, however, the Russophone newcomers had become the numerical majority in the "German" Jewish communities, both East and West (Kessler, 1997). The ambiguous minority of resident Jews was supposed to integrate them—begging the question of what these Jews were supposed to be integrated into (Kessler, 1997), as the small existing community was just slowly coming to terms with being residents, and not sojourning in Germany themselves. A significant number of Jews still dwelled on the myth of packed suitcases that reified the trauma underpinning the symbolic—and actual—packed suitcases, ambiguities that persisted in the third generation (Brumlik, 1998).

Symbolic or actual, the third generation of locally raised Jews evinced higher rates of psychopathologies than did their non-Jewish peers (Frerker, 1998). Even those unaffected by psychopathologies were of two minds about whether they were living in Germany or just sojourning (Ranan, 2014). Some left for Israel or other countries (Kranz, 2015a); others felt at home

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in Germany (Kranz, 2016a; Mendel, 2010). Relations between "locally raised Jews" and "Russians" are sometimes tense as the two populations entertain different notions of Jewishness in a reflection of their collectively infused and individually different biographies (Kessler, 2002). As these groups exist side by side, Jews from other countries are finding their way to Germany. The most significant group among them is the Israeli one, most of whose members belong to their native country's third generation and whose identities diverge from both groups previously mentioned, as our research found. Generally speaking, Jews in Germany have begun to show their diversity and vitality publically to an extent not evinced since the Nazi devastation, if not the Weimar Republic period, as intra-Jewish tensions over community membership or burial provisions may even find their way to courts of law.

Methodology

Our study of Israeli migrants in Germany relies on information that we collected using an online survey, face-to-face semistructured interviews, and ethnographic methods, including participant observation of individuals, groups, and social gatherings, ranging from family events to public, religious, and cultural ones. The integration of quantitative and qualitative data has been gaining strength in social science research, and in our case it prompted us to question the term that we initially used, *Israeli immigrants*, as we learned that immigration, emigration, and (ambivalent) migration coexist. This allowed us to adopt an approach that combines the best of both major methodological schools and mitigates some of the weaknesses associated with using only one of them (Bryman, 1988). The quantitative and qualitative data were collected simultaneously between the autumn of 2014 and the autumn of 2015; qualitative data were gathered on an ongoing basis. Our study focuses solely on native-born Israeli Jews.

The questionnaire used in our survey was uploaded to the web through the use of Qualtrics software. It comprised seventy-five items that were introduced under nine major headings (in the following order): *personal characteristics* such as year of birth, gender, country of birth, and marital status; *education*, referring to studies both in Israel and in Germany, as well as area of specialization; *language and culture*, that is, proficiency in Hebrew, proficiency in German, and consumption of Israeli press and websites; *employment*, mainly focusing on employment status and occupation; *geography*, at both origin and destination and including changes in place of residence after settlement in Germany; *familial and social ties* such as the frequency of

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