

Introduction

An Interpretive Strategy

In compiling this new *Conceptual Lexicon for Classical Confucian Philosophy*, my goal has been to try my best to take this Confucian philosophical tradition on its own terms. My concern has been that many of our new translations of these canonical texts are uncritically perpetuating the same formula for rendering key philosophical terms proffered in the earlier efforts at cultural translation. The consequence is that this now “standard” vocabulary has encouraged a sense of literalness and familiarity with an erstwhile “Chinese” philosophical vocabulary. Again, over the past several centuries these texts have in important degree been transplanted into a worldview and a commonsense not their own, and there has still been insufficient attention paid to a recovery of their own interpretive contexts that is a precondition for retaining their own integrity.

William James warns us that “We live forwards . . . but we understand backwards.”^① This same concern led William Faulkner to observe that “There is no such thing as *was*—only *is*.”^② Their important point is that we are always implicated in our experience, and thus we can never escape anachronism in our thinking about

① William James. *Pragmatism and Other Writings*. New York: Penguin, 2000, p. 98. In Lewis Carroll’s *Through the Looking Glass*, the White Queen says to Alice: “It’s a poor sort of memory that only works backwards.”

② William Faulkner. *The Lion in the Garden: Interviews with William Faulkner 1926-1962*. ed. James B. Meriwether and Michael Millgate. New York: Random House, 1968, p. 258.

it. The challenge then is that if all experience is necessarily a collaboration between us and our world and is thus always in degree a reflection of our own values and interests, what strategy can we appeal to in trying to understand the conceptual cluster of concepts that are used in the organization of these canonical texts?

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, most Europeans with a few marginal if not heretical exceptions saw world culture through a biblical lens. They believed with unwavering certainty that the cosmos was only a few thousand years old, that all life on earth including humanity was descended from Noah's ark, that Christianity is the only true and consummate religion from which all other religions are derived, that human faith and piety continue to play a pivotal role in the larger cosmic order and in its divine history, that the unreason of madness was a freely chosen moral error, and that each one of us has an immortal soul which, at the risk of irrevocable damnation, will one day stand before God in judgment for our deeds done.^① Such being the commonsense of the time, any discussion we might pursue today of the prevailing values at the beginning of the nineteenth century requires that we construct an interpretive context as a preemptive strategy for enabling us to take an earlier Europe on its own terms, and for resisting an overwriting of that period with our own, very different assumptions. If this problem of "uncommon assumptions" is a worry so close to home, how much more necessary then, is the construction of an interpretive context for our contemporary Western reading of the historically antique and culturally remote texts of classical Confucian philosophy?

Friedrich Nietzsche in his *Beyond Good and Evil* reflects upon how a specific worldview is sedimented into the very language that speaks it:

① Urs App makes just such a claim in his introductory comments to *The Birth of Orientalism*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010, p. xiii.

The strange family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and German philosophizing is explained easily enough. Where there is an affinity of languages, it cannot fail, owing to the common philosophy of grammar—I mean, owing to the unconscious domination and guidance by similar grammatical functions—that everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development and sequence of philosophical systems; just as the way seems barred against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation.^①

Nietzsche is certainly not endorsing any theory of strong linguistic determinism—that is, the idea that our languages necessarily constrain us to think in certain ways. Rather, he is simply observing that natural languages and their syntax—in his example here, the Indo-European family of languages—are over time invested with a particular cultural narrative’s insights into what makes the human experience meaningful. Natural languages and their structures tend to reveal the default worldviews and distilled commonsenses of the cultures they speak. Said another way, our languages “speak” us as much as we speak our languages, disposing us to entertain experience in one way as opposed to another, and prompting us to ask some questions rather than others.

Indeed, this same Nietzsche, reflecting on how languages such as French and German came to be gendered—“*la table*” and “*le soleil*”—allows that “when man gave all things a sex he thought, not that he was playing, but that he had gained a profound insight . . .”^② In fact, the oeuvre of Nietzsche himself is an object lesson in

① Friedrich Nietzsche. *Beyond Good and Evil*. trans. W. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1966, p. 20.

② Friedrich Nietzsche. *A Nietzsche Reader*. trans. R.J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, p. 86. One wonders what in the early days of these languages would prompt the French speakers to understand the sun as masculine and the moon as feminine, while their German cousins thought the opposite.

the very problem he ponders here: that is, the tension between recalcitrant tradition on the one hand, and disruptive innovation on the other. Our languages are conservative in wanting to speak from within their own narratives, and tend to resist new ideas in proportion to the disjunction these ideas have with what has gone before. Commonsense is obstinate. Thus, when Nietzsche famously proclaims “God is dead,” since his shared commonsense is heavily freighted with God, he must himself become linguistically dexterous. The object of his critique is the persistent transcendentalism and dualistic worldview that follows from it as it has become entrenched within the languages and cultural experience of the Abrahamic traditions. It is because Nietzsche is frustrated, compromised, and even betrayed by the deeply committed language in which he is attempting to give voice to his revolutionary ideas that he has little choice but to turn away from the more “literal” expository language available to him, and rely heavily upon rhetorical devices and literary tropes.

The distinguished British sinologist, Angus Graham, like Nietzsche, ascribes unique and evolving categories and conceptual structures to different cultural traditions, and in so doing, challenges the Saussurian structuralist distinction between *langue* (universal and systematic linguistic structures and rules governing all languages) and *parole* (diverse and open-ended speech acts in any of our natural languages).^① All the same, we might borrow Saussure’s distinction and take liberties with it that resists his structuralist assumptions to reinforce Graham’s point. We can use *langue* (language) to contrast the evolved, theoretical, and conceptual structure of any given language system as it has been shaped by an aggregating cultural intelligence over millennia, with *parole* (speech) as the application

① Saussure uses the analogy of a chess game, where *langue* are the fixed rules that govern the game while *parole* are the actual, varied moves made by different people that come to constitute any particular game.

of this natural language in the individual utterances we make.^① Graham and we fellow pluralists, need just such a distinction to reinforce our claim that the Chinese language has neither developed nor has available to it an indigenous concept or a term that can capture the Abrahamic notion of “God,” while at the same time insisting that this same Chinese language has all of the semantic and syntactic resources it needs to give a fair and robust account of such an idea. The basic claim here is that there is no vocabulary available in our Western languages to do justice to the conceptual structure of Confucianism. At the same time, while we have committed to the impoverishing translation of *li* 禮 as “ritual,” we cannot in fact “say” *li* in English, or in German either. Nonetheless we can say lots about this key Confucian notion in both European languages, and get pretty clear on what it means.

Recently, and specifically in reference to the classical Chinese language, Graham concludes that in reporting on the eventful flow of a Chinese *qi* 氣 cosmology made explicit in the first among the Confucian classics, the *Yijing* 易經 or *Book of Changes*, “the sentence structure of Classical Chinese places us in a world of process about which we must ask . . . ‘Whence?’ and also, since it is moving, ‘At what time?’”^② What Graham is saying here is that any perceived coherence in the emergent order of things assumed in Chinese cosmology, while being expressed in abstract, theoretical terms, is

① I am “borrowing” this distinction from Saussure because I do not want to endorse any kind of structuralism that would allow for a severe separation between *langue* and *parole*. Instead I would side with the sentiments of a Zhuangzi or a Mikhail Bakhtin who would see these two dimensions of language as mutually shaping and evolving in their always dialectical relationship. Utterances gradually change the structure of language, and the changing structure of our languages orients and influences the utterances that it makes possible. For them, what we think about and how we think, are coterminous and mutually shaping.

② A.C. Graham. *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990, pp. 360-411, especially p. 408.

at the same time resolutely historicist and situated, and hence has to be qualified by a location, by a particular time in its evolution, and also by its applications. For example, when understood within the context of this Confucian cosmology, Graham problematizes the translation of *renxing* 人性 as “human nature.” He avers that *renxing* in describing the human experience has been conceived of as an ongoing, open-ended, and evolving process rather than as some essential and “timeless” property or some universal endowment defined by formal and final causes. Thus, beyond the question of “*What* does the term *renxing* mean?” we must also ask the other questions: “*Where* was it thought of in this way?” “*Whence* did it come to mean this?” “*How* did it serve us to think of it in this way?,” and perhaps most importantly, “*Whither* is its impetus in defining who we will become?” Indeed, to appreciate the ubiquitousness of processual, gerundive thinking in this early cosmology, we might invoke a key distinction found in the *Changes*. While cosmic order and all that emerges within it has certainly been understood in general and persistent terms (*tong* 通), at the same time, it must always be qualified by the local, the specific, and the transitory process of change (*bian* 變). For Confucian cosmology, in referencing the ongoing transformation of the world around us, we must always respect the *where*, the *when*, and the *who* as specific qualifications integral to this ineluctable process. The crucial implication of Graham’s insight into Confucian cosmology is that all of the rational structures that might be appealed to in expressing our understanding of the human experience—that is, whatever theories, concepts, categories, and definitions we might reference—are all ultimately made vulnerable to change by the always shifting organs and objects of their application. In the flux and flow of experience, making sense of a changing world is itself a changing process.

An entailment of the claim that early Chinese cosmology gives privilege to change is that the language that expresses the worldview

and the commonsense in which the Chinese corpus is to be located is first and foremost “gerundive,” a feature that requires us at times to stretch ourselves conceptually by “verbing” nouns much more frequently than is the norm for English-speakers. Chinese, like ancient Hebrew but unlike most members of the Indo-European family of languages, is more eventful than substantial in its syntactic structure, and in much of its semantics as well. It is fairly well known that apart from context, virtually every Chinese graph can be here a noun, there an adjective, verb or adverb; less well known, or at least acknowledged by most translators, is the dynamic cosmos reflected in the language itself. “Things” are less in focus than events; nouns that would abstract and objectify elements of this world are derived from and revert back to their gerundive sensibilities. Indeed, I have argued at some length that a human being in this world is better understood to be an irreducibly relational “human becoming.”^①

The ontological language of substance and essence tends to defy this linguistic priority of dynamic thinking, committed as it is to the primacy of “things” rather than “happenings,” and to a more substantial “world” rather than a more fluid “experiencing of this world.” It is a fair observation that a careful reading of the introduction included in my *Sourcebook in Classical Confucian Philosophy* and this companion *Lexicon* is made necessary by the fact that the target language of this translation—English—reflects and reinforces ontological assumptions that differ in crucial respects from the natural cosmology sedimented into the structure of the object language—classical Chinese—and hence can only imperfectly be employed to “speak” the world being referenced in these Confucian texts.

We do not at all wish to suggest that the Chinese had no notion of substantiality, or that Indo-European languages cannot well

① See Roger T. Ames. *Human Becomings: Theorizing Persons for Confucian Role Ethics*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2020.

chronicle events.^① Chinese toes surely hurt when stubbed on rocks, and English joggers are not seen to be performing miracles. Nevertheless, English grammar tempts us to emphasize “thingness” in a way that classical Chinese did and does not, instead providing a framing of the event being referenced. Think of a simple English sentence such as “The wind is blowing.” We could never be surprised by this observation because wind cannot “do” (verb) anything *but* blow. But in fact, “wind” is made redundant in understanding that it is nothing more or less than the “blowing” itself. Rain is slightly more versatile: It can “pour;” but what does the “It” (noun) refer to in either “It is raining” or “It is pouring?” A “thing”—a subsisting agency, a subject—in our substance language is assumed as a necessary ground for action.

In the same way, while we as translators and commentators cannot easily avoid making statements such as “Master Zeng was the most *xiao* 孝 of all the disciples of Confucius,” it would be more sinologically accurate, if more stilted, to say that “Master Zeng *xiao*-ed more consistently than any of his peers.” And it would be even more accurate to understand Master Zeng himself as a compounding lifetime narrative of “*xiao*-ing” rather than as some discrete, constant entity. Thus, our exhortation to the reader of this *Lexicon* and the *Sourcebook* is: Think gerunds first, and try not to impose too many Western philosophically and/or religiously pregnant concepts on the text at hand. For instance, the isomorphic relationship between family and governing institutions (*jiaguotonggou* 家國同構) that is made so clear in these texts should warn the reader not to seek the sharp and dialectical distinction between private and public—the

① I am inclined to use “we” rather than “I” in my attempt to translate Confucian culture into the Western academy in deference to my teachers D.C. Lau, Lao Siguang, Fang Dongmei, Yang Youwei, and Angus Graham, and to the collaborators I have worked with over my career: especially David L. Hall and Henry Rosemont Jr. They are all very present in different ways in what I am trying to say.

“us” and “them”—that political theory as usually applied normally obliges us to draw, for it isn’t there. Nor is there any relevance to the bulk of the other largely exclusive dualisms so historically central in the Greek-inspired narrative of philosophy and theology: mind/body, transcendent/immanent, objective/subjective, sacred/profane, individual/collective, reality/appearance, and more. In sum, before we can appreciate the many ways in which the early Confucians are truly “just like us,” we must come to understand deeply the ways in which they were not.

Here as in our previous work, in seeking to revise the existing formula of translations, we want to be at once deconstructive and programmatic. That is, we begin from the concern that the popular translations of these philosophical terms in themselves often do not adequately respect the degree of difference between current ways of thinking, and the worldview in which these Chinese texts were produced. What is the most comfortable choice of language and what at first blush makes the best sense to the translator within the target language, might well be a warning signal that something that is originally *unfamiliar* is, at a stroke, being made familiar.

To take an example, if “principle” seems to most felicitous in translating *li* 理, particularly because of its moral connotations, we have to worry that it locates *li* squarely within classical Greek “One-behind-the-many” metaphysical thinking. *L. principium* from *princeps*—“first in time, position, or authority>prince, emperor”—introduces a notion of independent agency that might not be relevant to *li*. *Principium* is of course used to translate the Greek *arche* from *archon*—“the beginning, the ultimate underlying substance, the ultimate indemonstrable principle.” Indeed, the popular understanding of principle is strongly attached to associations that in sum suggest a fixed, foundational, predetermined, and originative law. In the absence of the degree of qualification that would in fact disqualify “principle” as a useful translation of *li*,

such associations have come to obscure rather than illuminate the processual worldview that predominates in Chinese cosmology. As clear evidence of this problem, influenced by an understanding of *li* as subsisting principles, many of the current interpretations of Zhu Xi have tended to subordinate an understanding of his project of self-cultivation to the recovery of a putative systematic metaphysics.

The existing formula of translations that includes *li* as “principle” has been “legitimized” by its unchallenged persistence and by its gradual insinuation into the standard Chinese-English and English-Chinese dictionaries and glosses. These dictionaries, in encouraging the uncritical assumption that this set of translations provides the student with a “literal” and thus “conservative” rendering of the terms, have become complicit in the entrenched cultural equivocation that we are attempting to address herein. Our argument is that it is in fact these now familiar, formulaic usages that are the “radical” rather than conservative interpretations. That is, to consciously or unconsciously transplant a text from its own intellectual soil and replant it in one that has a decidedly different philosophical terrain is as “radical” as it gets, tampering as it does with the very roots that have secured the text historically and culturally. A failure to conserve sufficiently the original cultural assumptions and problematic of the text is to take gross liberties with it. Indeed, it is our claim that it is our concerted effort to understand the text within its own cultural landscape, however imperfectly accomplished, that is properly conservative.

To be fair to the important new translations of the Confucian canons that have appeared over the past few generations, we must ask the question: At the end of the day, can European languages, freighted as they are with a historical commitment to substance ontology—what Jacques Derrida has called “logocentrism” and “the language of presence”—actually “speak” the processual worldview that grounds these Chinese texts? Can these canonical texts such as

the *Book of Changes* and the *Expansive Learning* (*Daxue* 大學) be translated into English and still communicate the worldview that has been invested in them? And more to the point, given the project presently at hand, how does this new conceptual lexicon propose to address the challenge of trying to provide an explanation of these Chinese terms that would respect its own implicit worldview?

Complexities in the Philosophy of Culture

Are we then to understand that the generic, persistent cultural assumptions that distinguish this Confucian worldview—what we are calling “an interpretive context”—are “essential” and unchanging conditions? Of course not. We have to unload this familiar “essentialism” charge that elides the important distinction between an impoverishing orientalism and responsible generalizations, between an exclusionary relativism and an open, inclusive pluralism, between incommensurability and the mutual accommodation that provides the possibility for hybridic growth.^①

But the need for unloading the essentialism charge against philosophers of culture is more complex. As a consequence of the challenge of new directions in historiographical thinking, over the past several decades the assumption that cultural families develop their distinctive patterns of values, norms, and practices in relative isolation from one another has become markedly less trenchant. Both historians and philosophers have come to recognize significant distortions that attend any unreflective tendencies to compartmentalize the ancient and premodern worlds according

① See my essay “Unloading the Essentialism Charge: Reflections on Methodology in Doing Philosophy of Culture.” *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*. ed. Steven Burik, Robert Smid, and Ralph Weber. London: Bloomsbury Academic Press, forthcoming.

to currently prevailing spatial and conceptual divisions and their underlying (often highly political) rationales. In particular, critical assessment is now well underway regarding the degree to which persistent prejudices about metageography—especially the “myth of continents”—have shaped and continue to shape representations of history and cultural origins. The classic assertion of “independently originating” European and Asian cultures on either side of the Ural mountains, for example, is being abandoned in favor of highlighting “Eurasian” characteristics in the complex cultural genealogies of both “West” and “East.”^① Indeed, given that cultures arise interculturally, or better yet, *intra*-culturally, in wide-ranging, intimate commerce with one another over time as a borderless ecology of cultures having an inside without an outside, it would seem that no culture *can* be fully understood in isolation from others. It was for this reason that years ago, David Hall and I asked the question: Is there really more than one culture?^② If we follow Wittgenstein with his “family resemblances” and “language games” to its logical conclusion, then given the contingencies of culture, foregoing reduction or sublation, it is the unsummed and unbounded context containing mutually incoherent and yet imbricated games that may be called “culture.” The engagement between two cultures, then, is the articulation of alternative importances within a single (incoherent) complex. This understanding of culture resonates rather closely with the “focus and field” understanding of *dao* 道 as the unbounded and unsummed totality of orders as they are construed from insistently particular perspectives (*de* 德). Given the vagueness and complexity that attends such an understanding of order, one needs to make no

① See Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen. *Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

② David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames. *Anticipating China: Thinking Through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, Chapter 2, “The Contingency of Culture.”

final distinction among different cultures and their languages.^①

Again, we must think genealogically as well as morphologically. That is, the development and growth of particular cultures certainly takes place through historical interactions among them that result either in accommodations of differences as conditions for mutual contribution, or in a competition for acknowledged superiority. But cultures change not only in adaptive response to other cultures and to political, economic, and environmental exigencies, but are also animated by an internal impulse as an expression of their own particular aspirations. Quite often, this change involves and requires envisioning ways of life distinctively other than those that are near and familiar, revealing with greater or lesser clarity what present cultural realities are not, and do not promise. Cultural change *does* occur in response to differing circumstantial realities, but it also takes place as a function of pursuing new or not-yet-actualized ideals. Said differently, ideals as “ends-in-view”—what Charles Taylor calls “hypergoods”—are also realities that live in history, and that at least in degree, have the force of directing the patterns of change.^②

This recognition of the indigenous impulse has as its own corollary the insight that the histories through which cultures narrate their own origins and development are not primarily aimed at accurately depicting a closed past, but rather at disclosing arcs of change projected into open and yet more or less distinctly anticipated

① See David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames. *Anticipating China*. pp. 175-179.

② “Hypergoods” is a useful neologism introduced by Charles Taylor in his *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989, pp. 62-63:

Most of us not only live with many goods but find that we have to rank them, and in some cases, this ranking makes one of them of supreme importance relative to the others. . . . Let me call higher-order goods of this kind “hypergoods,” i.e. goods which not only are incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint from which these must be weighed, judged, decided about.

futures. The cliché that history is written by the winners is perhaps better couched in terms of history being written to affirm that what has occurred *amounts to* a victory. At some level cultural change is inseparable from the process of both valorizing and actualizing new (or at least alternative) interpretations of the changes that have occurred. Thus, in trying to glean resources from our own past cultural narratives, we must be self-conscious of the fact that our redescrptions of these histories while certainly being informed by their past, are also being reformulated to serve our own contemporary needs and interests.

Resources for Developing a Chinese Philosophical Vocabulary

An astute Ludwig Wittgenstein insists that “the limits of our language mean the limits of our world.” If this is the case, in order to take Chinese philosophy on its own terms, we will quite literally need more language. The premise then is that there is no real alternative for students of Confucian philosophy but to cultivate a nuanced familiarity with the key Chinese vocabulary itself included in this lexicon. The self-conscious strategy of this conceptual lexicon is to prepare students to read the seminal texts by going beyond simple word-for-word translation and by systematically developing their own sophisticated understanding of a cluster of the most critical Chinese philosophical terms themselves. We might take as one example, *tian* 天, conventionally translated as “Heaven.” I would argue that such word-for-word translation not only fails utterly to communicate the import of this recondite term, but can in the long run be counterproductive to the extent that it encourages students in reading texts to inadvertently rely upon the usual implications of the translated term “Heaven” rather than on the range of meaning implicit in the original Chinese term itself. When students read *tian* 天 as “Heaven” rather than as *tian* 天, they are sure to read the

text differently, and in all likelihood, in a way heavily freighted with Western theological assumptions.

By way of analogy, when we reflect on our best efforts in the discipline to read and teach classical Greek philosophy, many if not most of us do not have an expert knowledge of classical Greek and the original language texts. But in developing a sophisticated understanding of an extended cluster of the most important Greek philosophical terms—*logos*, *nomos*, *nous*, *phusis*, *kosmos*, *eidos*, *psyche*, *soma*, *arche*, *alethea*, and so on—we can with imagination, get beyond our own uncritical Cartesian assumptions and at least in degree, read these Greek texts on their own terms. In a similar way, by seeking to understand and to ultimately appropriate the key philosophical vocabulary around which the Chinese texts are structured, students will be better able to locate these canonical texts within their own Confucian intellectual and cultural assumptions. The only alternative to doing our best to take the tradition on its own terms is to participate in a further colonializing of Chinese philosophy and the truncating of its long history. We have to resist the unconscious and patently spurious assumption that this tradition's fairly recent encounter with the vocabulary of the Western academy has been its defining moment. Such an uncritical approach places the uniqueness, the heterogeneity, and the intrinsic worth of the Chinese philosophical tradition at real risk.

I and my collaborators D.C. Lau, David Hall, and Henry Rosemont Jr. in our earlier translations of several of the canonical texts have over the years compiled a rather substantial glossary of philosophical terms describing the implications and the nuanced evolution of this extended cluster of key philosophical concepts. Indeed, it is this collaboration that is again my warrant for often using a plural “we” rather than the singular “I.” Robert Cummings Neville has mused upon how we as a small group of Confucians with our considerable intellectual, philosophical, and personal differences have in many

ways over our shared narratives actually “become” one another—as good Confucian friends are wont to do.^① Neville’s point is that the sustained dividends to be reaped from enduring friendships over a lifetime are not only substantial, but indeed transformative. In this Confucian tradition, to “make” friends is quite literally to participate in the “making” of each other to the extent that it is the friendships that are most concrete, while the putative “individuals” who participate in this matrix of relationships become increasingly only an abstraction from it.

In this new conceptual lexicon, I have revised and expanded upon our earlier efforts. In addition, in order to prompt and encourage students to reference this explanatory glossary, in the companion *Sourcebook in Classical Confucian Philosophy* I have included along with the “placeholder” translations, the romanization and the Chinese characters for these key terms as, for example, “exemplary persons” (*junzi* 君子). Again, sometimes the same Chinese term in a different context is better served by a different English translation. For example, this same *junzi* in other contexts should quite properly be translated as “lord” or “prince” or “ruler.” Just as our reflections on the interpretive context is a self-conscious attempt to be as cognizant as we can about our uncommon assumptions, I think it is equally important to say up front why we have translated particular terms in the way we do, and what reasons we have for abandoning some of the earlier formulations.

But let me be clear about the expectations I have for the reader of this lexicon. At the end of the day, the project here is not to replace one set of problematic translations with yet another contestable set of renderings. The goal is to encourage students to reference this glossary of key philosophical terms in their reading of the translated

① Robert Cummings Neville. “On the Importance of the Ames-Hall Collaboration.” *Appreciating the Chinese Difference: Engaging Roger T. Ames on Methods, Issues, and Roles*. ed. Jim Behuniak. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2018.

texts with the hope that in the fullness of time they will appropriate the key Chinese terminologies themselves and make them their own—*tian* 天, *dao* 道, *ren* 仁, *yi* 義, and so on. In thus developing their own increasingly robust insight into these philosophical terms, the students will be able to carry this nuanced understanding over to inform a critical reading of other currently available translations. Ultimately for students who would understand Chinese philosophy, *tian* 天 must be understood as *tian* 天, and *dao* 道 must be *dao* 道.

The Resolutely Interpretive Nature of Translation

In describing our translation of these key terms as “self-consciously interpretive,” I am not allowing in any way that we are recklessly speculative or given to license in our renderings, nor that we are willing to accept the reproach that we are any less “literal” or more “creative” than other translators. On the contrary, I would insist first that any pretense to a literal translation is not only naïve, but is itself an “objectivist” cultural prejudice of the first order. Just as each generation selects and carries over earlier thinkers to reshape them in its own image, each generation reconfigures the classical canons of world philosophy to its own needs. We too are inescapably people of a time and place. This self-consciousness then, is not to disrespect the integrity of the Chinese philosophical narrative, but to endorse one of the fundamental premises of this commentarial tradition—that is, textual meaning is irrepressibly emergent, and that, like it or not, we translators are integral to the growth of the tradition, and as such, are not passive in the process of interpretation.

At a general level, I would suggest that English as the target language carries with it such an overlay of cultural assumptions that, in the absence of “self-consciousness,” the philosophical import of these Chinese terms can be seriously compromised. Further, a failure of translators to be self-conscious and to take fair account

of their own Gadamerian “prejudices” with the confidence that they are relying on the existing “objective” Chinese-English dictionary—a resource that, were the truth be known, is itself heavily colored with cultural biases—is to betray their readers not once, but twice.^① That is, not only have they failed to provide the “objective” reading of the terms they have promised, but they have also neglected to warn their unsuspecting reader of the cultural assumptions they have willy-nilly insinuated into their translations.

Chinese Philosophy as “Eastern Religions”

As a case in point, it has become a commonplace to acknowledge that, in the process of Western humanists attempting to make sense of the classical Chinese philosophical literature, many unannounced Western assumptions and generic characteristics have been inadvertently introduced into their understanding of these texts, and have colored the vocabulary through which this understanding has been articulated. We must allow that this tradition has often if not usually been analyzed within the framework of categories and philosophical problems not its own.

Well-intended Christian missionaries bent on saving the soul of China introduced this ancient world into the Western academy

① In the second part of *Truth and Method*, 2nd ed. London: Sheed and Ward, 1989, Hans-Georg Gadamer develops four key concepts central to his hermeneutics: prejudice, tradition, authority, and horizon. He uses “prejudices” not in the sense that prejudice is blind, but on the contrary, in the sense that a clear awareness of our judgments can facilitate rather than obstruct our understanding. That is, our assumptions can positively condition our experience. But we must always entertain these assumptions critically, being aware that the hermeneutical circle in which understanding is always situated requires that we must continually strive to be conscious of what we bring to our experience and must pursue increasingly adequate judgments that can inform our experience in better and more productive ways.

by appealing to the vocabulary of their universal faith, ascribing to Confucian culture most of the accouterments of an Abrahamic religion. Early on, traditional Chinese philosophical texts were translated into English and other European languages by missionaries who used a Christian vocabulary to convert these canonical texts wholesale into the liturgy of what could only be a second-rate Christianity. Indeed, over the last several centuries of cultural encounter, the vocabulary established for the translation of classical Chinese texts into Western languages has been freighted by an often-unconscious Christian framework, and the effects of this “Christianization” of Chinese texts are still very much with us. The examples of grossly inappropriate language having become the standard equivalents in the Chinese-English dictionaries that we use to perpetuate our understanding of Chinese culture are legion: “the Way” (*dao* 道), “Heaven” (*tian* 天), “benevolence” (*ren* 仁), “righteousness” (*yi* 義), “rites” or “rituals” (*li* 禮), “virtue” (*de* 德), “substance” (*ti* 體), “principle” (*li* 理), “material substance” (*qi* 氣), and so on. How can any Western student read the capitalized “Way” without thinking of Jesus’s proclamation that “I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life?” How can a capitalized “Heaven” be read as anything other than a metonym for the notion of a transcendent God? Is living a life as this grandfather’s granddaughter properly described as a “rite” or “ritual?” How can we reduce what is quite literally the image of cultivated, consummate human beings in all of their aspects—their cognitive, moral, aesthetic, religious, and somatic sensibilities—to a single, patently Christian virtue: “benevolence?” When and in what context would a native English speaker ever utter the word “righteousness” other than as having a religious reference?^①

① The Tyndale Bible (1526) translates the Hebrew term *tzedek* occurring some 500 times in the Hebrew Bible and is conferred on those who are pleasing to God as “righteous.”

Chinese philosophy understood through this existing formula of key philosophical terms has been made familiar to Western readers by first “Christianizing” it, and then more recently, by “orientalizing” it and ascribing to it a deprecating poetical-mystical-occult and religious worldview as the alter image to our logical-rational-enlightened and humanistic self-understanding. The classics of Chinese philosophy in most American and European bookstores are usually located under the rubric “Eastern Religions” between the Bibles and the New Age, and are shelved in our libraries under either “BL” as “Eastern Religions” or “PL” as literature.

Many of the more philosophically-inclined sinologists who have been involved in the recent translation of canonical Chinese works are now acknowledging that a fuller inventory of semantic matrices might be necessary for the translation of these philosophical texts, and are struggling to get beyond the default, “commonsensical” vocabularies of their own native cultural sensibilities. As a matter of fact, the recent archaeological recovery of new versions of existing philosophical texts and the discovery of many others that have been long lost, in occasioning the retranslation of many of the philosophical classics, has provided both a pretext and an opportunity for philosophers to step up and rethink our standard renderings of the philosophical vocabulary. Most importantly, it has presented us with the challenge of trying, with imagination, to take these texts on their own terms by locating and interpreting them within their own worldviews.

An Interpretive Asymmetry: Vernacular Asian Languages and the Language of Modernity

Beyond this impoverishing “Christianization” and “orientalization” of the Confucian canons that has taken place within the Western academy, there is also another kind of profound asymmetry that